



Malaysian Youth Delegation 2024
MYD Post-SB60 Report

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Disclaimer and Acknowledgements

The views and opinions expressed in this report are attributed to the authors and may not necessarily reflect the official views of MYD. Any and all written errors are the authors' own.

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We welcome any and all constructive feedback on this report. Kindly reach out to us at focalpoint@mydclimate.org.

Glossary

AILAC	Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CBDR-RC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
COP28	Twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties
COP29	Twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the Parties
CSRD	Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive
G77	The Group of 77
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
IPLC	Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LMDC	Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries
MOI	Means of Implementation
MWP	Mitigation Work Programme
MYD	Malaysian Youth Delegation
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NC4	Fourth National Communication Report
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
SB60	Sixtieth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, also known as the 2024 Bonn Climate Change Conference

SB61 Sixty-first sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, which take place at COP29

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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Introduction

The Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD) is a volunteer-based civil society organisation which focuses on representing Malaysia's local youth climate movement and raising awareness of climate policies among Malaysians. MYD had the opportunity to attend SB60 in Bonn, where three of our representatives followed the negotiation tracks on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

In addition to following these negotiation tracks, our representatives also attended multiple side events as speakers and participants, including those organised by YOUNGO (the official youth constituency of UNFCCC) and the Bonn Climate Camp.

In this report, MYD hopes to emphasise the importance of youth perspectives and capabilities, as well as the role they can play in the Malaysian climate advocacy, negotiations and policy process.

Negotiation Track I: Mitigation Work Programme

Context

One of the areas tracked was Mitigation, specifically on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP; UNFCCC, 2023). This was of interest to MYD given the MWP is one of the main facilitative dialogues under the UNFCCC and has just gone through its first round of modalities last year, and another global dialogue towards the end of May, just before SB60 commenced this year. The negotiations focused primarily on the conflict of interests between developing and predominantly developed countries - whether the Global Stocktake outcomes (GST; UNFCCC, 2024c) should play a bigger role in facilitating the MWP.

The MWP's mandate specifies that modalities should be implemented to complement GST outcomes, which developing countries including the LMDC¹ argued should be respected. However, primarily developed countries plus AOSIS² and AILAC³ argued for using the MWP as a vehicle to deliver on the GST outcomes, which would mean imposing targets for mitigation action and expanding the scope of the MWP which was intended to be a facilitative dialogue instead. While this latter position is meant to respond to the urgency of meeting the 1.5°C target, funding to support using the MWP to act on GST outcomes and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) were not brought up for the majority of negotiations.

Another point of contention in the MWP negotiations is whether it is linked to the development of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs; UNFCCC, 2022); developing countries specified that there is no direct link, while the majority of developed countries argued that the MWP should facilitate the development of NDCs and amplify the ambition of NDCs as it is set out to do. Again, this is because amplifying ambition means higher targets will need to be set which means more resource use. As mentioned earlier, funding was not brought up for most of these interventions, which completely disregards the position of developing countries in having to scale up ambition and implementation.

Observations and Recommendations

Honing in on Malaysia's position, there were no interventions made by G77 + China nor Malaysia. From observing the MWP negotiations, there were opportunities for Malaysia to take on a more active stance in negotiations. Firstly, it could have iterated support for the inclusion of equity and CBDR-RC principles, which were voiced by only a few countries. It is in developing countries' interest to not advocate for a complete integration of MWP with GST outcomes, and subsequently, the NDCs unless there are clear financing mechanisms for developed countries to support developing countries. Malaysia should be vocal in advocating for financing requirements for increased mitigation ambition, especially given the unique challenges present in Southeast Asia which were not represented adequately within negotiations.

¹ Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries

² Alliance of Small Island States

³ Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean

Malaysia would also benefit from being more proactive in sharing their experiences of the modalities under the MWP, and whether they are facilitative in helping the country coordinate and implement mitigation actions. The primary purpose of the MWP is to be a space for sharing experience and best practices, to equip other countries and learn from each other, in implementing mitigation ambition and action. Hence, understanding how Malaysia has responded from these modalities is useful in ensuring these modalities actually support the country's mitigation actions. It can also help reiterate Malaysia's position as a developing country and the need for various forms of support for mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Beyond negotiations, Malaysia's NDC 3.0 development will benefit from cross-sectoral collaboration that is organised and governed by a unified framework. This will facilitate the mainstreaming of mitigation action across Ministries, rather than siloing climate action to a few sectors. Contingent on how the NCQG negotiations pan out at COP29, it can be useful for Malaysia to specify unconditional and conditional targets in its NDC 3.0 to ensure that there is sufficient funding from both domestic and international sources. The calls for heightening transparency, scaling up ambition and implementation, using more rigorous methods such as stakeholder engagement in exploring different data sources, and increasing cross-sectoral collaboration will require more funding. Domestic funding sources for mitigation and adaptation efforts should also be deliberated on. For example, the oil and gas sector is prominent in Malaysia, hence more consideration should be given to a solid plan for phasing down fossil fuels and diversifying the economy.

During the Annual GST Dialogue, Chile shared their NDC development strategy and recommended the adoption of a national definition of equity by extending from a global definition, so that the strategies recommended are relevant for local communities. This recommendation is relevant for Malaysia, given we are a multiracial country and aim to include Indigenous communities in the NDC 3.0 development. For example, a definition of what equity means for Malaysia will support the development and increase the transparency of mitigation strategies. Dimensions on gender and children should be included in this definition of equity, given the disproportionate effects faced by women and children due to climate change. This will also ensure the ambition of NDCs does not have unintended consequences and can produce positive outcomes for those most affected by the climate hazards in Malaysia. There should also be an added consideration of young people in the definition of equity as the language can hopefully facilitate more young people's inclusion in climate-related planning, given our inherited consequences of climate impacts.

To sum up, our recommendations for Malaysia based on our observations of the MWP negotiations include:

1. Advocating for equity and CBDR-RC principles in negotiations related to mitigation ambition and implementation, and contextualising it to the unique needs of the region.
2. Being more proactive in mitigation negotiations such as the MWP, given that mitigation is equally as important as adaptation in working towards the 1.5°C target and ensuring the country's climate resilience and safety.

3. Sharing experience from participating in the modalities under the MWP to ensure its continual improvement so that MWPs can serve their purpose in supporting our country's and region's mitigation efforts.
4. Related to the NDC 3.0 development,
 - a. Specifying conditional and unconditional targets to ensure sufficient funding which can support transparent and rigorous planning and implementation.
 - b. Having a definition of equity, contextualised to Malaysia's circumstances and emphasising the dimensions of gender and youth more explicitly.

Negotiation Track II: Global Goal on Adaptation and National Adaptation Plans

Context

At SB60, MYD's representative focused on two key adaptation agendas: the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Unfortunately, there was minimal progress on these agendas by the end of SB60. While all parties engaged in discussions about adaptation, a notable difference emerged – developing countries expressed a strong sense of urgency and pushed for conversations on Adaptation Finance and Means of Implementation (MOI) while developed nations were less receptive, often dismissing these discussions without offering constructive feedback or solutions.

In the GGA negotiations, the focus was on the two-year UAE-Belém work program⁴, which aims to develop indicators (i.e., work plan, timeline, inputs, involvement of stakeholders) to measure adaptation progress and improve the GGA Framework. From MYD's observations, the discussions centred on three main points:

1. Appointing an expert lead for the UAE-Belém Work Programme.
2. Strengthening language and setting a specific target for Means of Implementation (MOI) support, including finance, capacity building, and technology transfer for developing countries.
3. Emphasising "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" (CBDR) by applying relevant principles and provisions from the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

Regarding the expert lead issue, there was disagreement between developed and developing countries. Developed nations wanted the Adaptation Committee (AC) to lead, while developing countries preferred creating a new "Informal Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group" to avoid potential bias from the AC, which consists of negotiators (Third World Network, 2024). Developing countries also wanted to include global scientists and experts. No agreement was reached, but the text reflects all parties' views in a footnote, and this will be revisited at COP29.

On the topic of Means of Implementation (MOI), developed countries wanted to remove MOI-related discussions, while developing countries argued for its inclusion, believing it would help identify gaps and needs. No consensus was achieved since most attention was given to points (1) and (3).

For the third point, concerning the "relevant principles and provisions" of the Paris Agreement, the United States and Japan wanted to remove references made to these areas, while developing countries wanted the phrase to be included verbatim to highlight the principles of CBDR-RC. A compromise was reached where the text⁵ will recall the Paris Agreement principles rather than quoting them directly.

⁴Decision -/CMA.5, para. 39. <https://unfccc.int/documents/636595>

⁵FCCC/SB/2024/L.6 <https://unfccc.int/documents/638839>

In the NAPs negotiations, developing countries expressed challenges in creating their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The challenges were mainly due to a lack of financial resources affecting all stages: formulation, implementation, and monitoring. To address this issue, there is a difference in perspectives on funding contributions. Developing countries called for an increase in financial support from developed countries. On the other hand, developed countries suggested mobilising finance from multiple sources, particularly the private sector, to supplement adaptation funds. With the new draft text made by the co-chairs on June 10th, developing countries accepted it and wanted it forwarded to SB61 in Baku for further negotiations as it reflected many of their proposals, especially the reference to highlight on CBDR-RC which states that the developed countries have to provide financial support to adaptation. In contrast, developed countries rejected the draft, arguing it was "incredibly unbalanced" and did not adequately represent all viewpoints. No agreement was reached, therefore the issue was postponed to COP29 for further discussion. The work from SB60 was acknowledged but had minimal impact, noted only as a footnote in the conclusion text⁶.

Observations and Recommendations

Although there is clear collaboration among countries, the negotiations often seem repetitive and yield limited progress. Discussions tend to revolve around the same issues, particularly concerning finance and implementation. Developed countries often avoided direct conversations about financial mechanisms, often deflecting responsibility to other sectors or suggesting that the private sector should fund adaptation efforts. For example in the NAPs negotiations, there was a strong push from the developed parties for private sector involvement in adaptation finance.

Discussions on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) also faced challenges as the outcomes often result in compromises made by developing countries, despite these countries bearing the brunt of climate impacts, like increasing floods and droughts, including Malaysia.

Malaysia's influence in these negotiations was observed as currently limited, often aligning with the positions of the G77 + China. This could be due to the early stage of the GGA framework, where scrutiny may not be necessary as parties are still establishing the foundational basis, particularly concerning the Means of Implementation (MOI). Alternatively, it might be because Malaysia has not yet submitted our National Adaptation Plan (NAP).

The development and submission of our National Adaptation Plan (NAP) should be a top priority. The NAP process is iterative, allowing countries for continuous planning, implementation, and revision. This flexibility allows for Malaysia to continuously update its NAP to address evolving adaptation needs. Delaying this would only hinder Malaysia's ability to effectively engage in adaptation negotiations and articulate our needs to other Parties and the UN.

By developing our NAP, Malaysia can enhance its involvement in climate adaptation negotiations and better identify the support we need. Additionally, a well-crafted NAP will allow

⁶ FCCC/SB/2024/L.6 <https://unfccc.int/documents/638839>

us to refine and improve the adaptation components in our Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Given Malaysia's experience with developing National Communications⁷ (NC4, as of 2024), it is evident that Malaysia's capacity in data collection and analysis has improved over the years. Hence, it is now time to leverage these data points to implement actionable adaptation solutions. NAP should be developed from a cross-cutting perspective, involving multiple ministries, Non-Profit Organisations (NGOs) and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLC) to ensure comprehensive coverage of sectors such as agriculture, health, infrastructure, and finance. Different locations and backgrounds in Malaysia require tailored adaptation strategies, and our IPLC's input is essential for developing effective solutions, essentially a bottom-up approach. A collaborative approach will ensure that all relevant aspects of Malaysian society are addressed and integrated into our adaptation strategy.

With the NAP in place, Malaysia may seek funding more effectively, engage more deeply in adaptation negotiations, and start addressing the impacts of climate change. This approach will not only strengthen Malaysia's climate adaptation framework but also support sustainable development and resilience nationwide.

Adaptation and mitigation should not be treated as separate entities but as complementary efforts. While Malaysia has investments and a budget allocated for mitigation strategies, such as the transition to solar energy, a similar level of strategic planning is necessary for adaptation. Developing a comprehensive national adaptation budget will ensure that resources are allocated effectively to areas most vulnerable to climate change.

Malaysia cannot solely rely on adaptation funds from the UN Parties, as that process is often slow and under negotiation. Therefore, it is crucial for Malaysia to establish its own dedicated budget for adaptation. This approach will ensure timely and effective allocation of resources to address our response to both current and future climate impacts.

To sum up, our recommendations for Malaysia based on our observations of the GGA and NAPs negotiations include:

1. Prioritise development and submission of Malaysia's National Adaptation Plan
2. The development of Malaysia's National Adaptation Plan should be a bottom-up approach with a cross-cutting perspective involving multiple relevant stakeholders
3. Integrate adaptation elements and requirements into our National Budget

⁷ Fourth National Communication Report (NC4) <https://unfccc.int/documents/638313>

Negotiation Track III: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG)

Context

The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) was one of the main interests of MYD at SB60, due to its intersection with the other tracks, as well as the much anticipated lead-up to COP29 in Baku. Similar to Article 6 which was preceded by the Clean Development Mechanism, the NCQG was widely debated because it had a precedence - the \$100 billion goal which failed to reach its target on time. This laid the foundation for several of the elements that were widely debated during the negotiations, as parties had learnt from their failed experience in trying to make the previous goal a reality. Concurrently, this also meant that parties refused to cave in to each other's stances to seek middle ground, as donors and recipients believed in fundamentally opposing principles for each element of the goal.

As an overview, elements that were discussed among many others include context, themes, sources & instruments, recipients, channels, access, structure, and time frame. The single common thing that all parties agreed upon was the length of the draft negotiation text being too long, and disagreed on every other aspect of the goal. No headway was made throughout the four sessions of the second meeting under the ad hoc work programme of the NCQG. The negotiations were particularly heated when it came to deletion of paragraphs around sensitive topics, such as mentions of fossil fuels, or conditions tied to mitigation ambitions. Parties were unwilling to compromise on any language tweaks – which is how middle ground is conventionally achieved – and resorted to calling each other out on their respective alleged unwillingness to fulfil financial obligations (targeted at developed countries) or climate action obligations (targeted at developing countries).

Observations and Recommendations

The crux of developing nations' frustration centred on developed countries' refusal to commence negotiations related to financial quantum. The latter claimed that without agreeing on fundamentals such as the context, sources and structure, it was not possible to propose a financial quantum. However from developing countries' point of view this sentiment came across as rather insincere, especially when developed countries kept repeating elements like equal accessibility for women and children which are important, but dim in significance when other main elements such as quantum are not mentioned, giving the impression that there is intentional stalling and avoidance of major issues.

As an upper-middle income country and fossil fuel producing nation, Malaysia's position in NCQG can be viewed as precarious. Depending on how negotiations pan out, Malaysia could potentially be lumped into the "donor base" if the focus is no longer on "developed" and "developing" countries, and rises in economical prowess in the future, despite acknowledgement of fossil fuel nations' unique difficulties and needs for a just transition within the UNFCCC⁸.

⁸ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Additionally, if the negotiations' focus on context shifts from Article 9 of Paris Agreement to Article 2.1(c), i.e., in developed countries' favour to embed conditionality on recipients' climate mitigation action, it rules out the possibility of Malaysia receiving funding in the short and medium term, given our strong reliance on fossil fuels production.

As a starting point, Malaysia should start identifying and allying with countries that have common predicaments amidst the large coalition of developing countries that is G77 + China. As mentioned in previous paragraphs, setting conditional and unconditional targets within NDCs as well as formalising a National Adaptation Plan are crucial starting points in identifying financial needs. Once these steps have been taken, it will be beneficial to identify similar countries that are balancing mitigation and adaptation fronts with national development needs, and ally with them to identify financial mechanisms that can work in these specific contexts. While it is imperative to continue demanding for concessional loans and grants alongside LDCs⁹ and AOSIS, it is possible that little progress will be made on this front given the dynamics and influence certain parties have over the negotiation process. By uniting voices, Malaysia has a potential to advocate for climate finance in a way that works for the nation through innovative financial instruments like debt-for-climate or debt-for-nature swaps. It is imperative that we find a solution that works for us, while leveraging our strengths in other areas, including being a megadiverse¹⁰ nation.

To strengthen Malaysia's stance in advocating for a materialised NCQG, we should also identify financial requirements and begin embedding them in our NDC, NAP and NBSAP¹¹. Leveraging guidance such as the Conservation International's [Guide to Including Nature in Nationally Determined Contributions](#), and examples from other countries such as [Vanuatu's NDC](#), Malaysia should prepare itself for the increased calls on transparency and reporting by proactively building systems and processes that can foster cross-collaborations between ministries, sectors and even companies, stimulating climate action and understanding the actual climate finance quantum that is needed on the ground. While imperfect, existing climate finance disclosures and classifications standards such as the EU Taxonomy and CSRD¹² can be referred to, to understand how Malaysia can leapfrog ahead and prepare itself for future requirements in securing climate finance, and formulate national strategies that are future proof, in spite of the various possible outcomes of the NCQG negotiations.

To sum up, our recommendations for Malaysia based on our observations of the GGA and NAPs negotiations include:

1. Identifying and allying with other developing countries within larger coalitions that experience similar predicaments in balancing climate and development needs, and advocating for climate finance solutions that can work for these unique contexts

⁹ Least Developed Countries

¹⁰ Megadiverse in the context of having great biodiversity. Malaysia is ranked 12th in the world according to the National Biodiversity Index

¹¹ National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan

¹² EU's Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive

2. Future proofing national strategies and plans by building financial needs and requirements into national commitments, in preparation for any outcomes that can result from NCQG negotiations

Negotiation Track IV: Article 6

Context

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement facilitates voluntary cooperation among countries to achieve their climate goals through market mechanisms. The report focuses on two main components: Article 6.2, which involves cooperative approaches that allow for the transfer of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) through bilateral agreements, and Article 6.4, which establishes a centralised mechanism under UNFCCC for carbon crediting.

The recent negotiations on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement during the SB60 sessions hosted by the UNFCCC marked a critical juncture in the development of international carbon markets and cooperative approaches to climate action. Following the limited progress at COP28 in Dubai, where key decisions on Article 6 were not adopted, SB60 provided a platform for renewed discussions.

During SB60, negotiators discussed emission avoidance, treatment of confidential information, authorisation processes and common terminologies. Although some agreements were reached, significant conflicts remained regarding transparency, oversight, and the integrity of carbon markets. The negotiations highlighted diverging views among countries, particularly between developed and developing nations, regarding the level of accountability required for ITMOs.

Observations and Recommendations

The lack of consensus caused challenges to the negotiations, especially on key methodological principles hindered progress on operationalising the centralised crediting mechanism under Article 6.4, with many technical discussions insufficiently addressed due to time constraints. The definition and inclusion of emission avoidance activities in Articles 6.2 and 6.4 remain contentious; there was significant debate over whether emissions avoidance activities and conservation enhancement projects (such as REDD+) should be permitted to generate emissions reduction units under Article 6. The decision on this matter was deferred until 2028, reflecting ongoing tensions regarding the types of activities that qualify for market mechanisms and the criteria for their implementation. While there was a spirit of compromise among parties, substantial disagreements persisted over key issues. The final texts forwarded for further discussion at COP29 in Baku reflected unresolved tensions regarding transparency and oversight in carbon markets.

The outcomes from SB60 will inform negotiations at COP29, where parties are expected to address outstanding issues more comprehensively. The goal is to finalise frameworks that will enable effective implementation of Article 6 mechanisms. Technical workshops are planned to prepare parties better for discussions at COP29, aiming to resolve lingering uncertainties regarding authorisation processes and registry functionalities.

Therefore, our recommendations for Malaysia based on our observations of the Article 6 negotiations include:

- Malaysia should advocate for strong transparency measures within Article 6 mechanisms to ensure environmental integrity by supporting the establishment of rigorous methodologies for measuring, reporting, and verifying emissions reductions associated with Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs).
- As part of its engagement in Article 6 mechanisms, Malaysia should align its strategies with global climate finance initiatives. Ensuring that Malaysia's participation in carbon markets contributes to broader efforts to mobilise climate finance for adaptation and mitigation projects.
- As a biodiverse country, Malaysia should also explore non-market approaches to implement mitigation and adaptation actions, especially by leveraging existing civil society organisations which have extensive experience in the conservation sector.

Conclusion: Youths' Role in SB60

Being able to attend SB60 as an MYD delegate for several reasons listed below:

1. Observing the negotiation and decision-making process helped in forming a more realistic understanding of climate policy processes governed under the UNFCCC. It also helped in understanding the geopolitical tensions behind conflicting positions, such as observed in the MWP. Additionally, having observed under the capacity of MYD helps in providing a non-state, third-party perspective, especially in making recommendations for Malaysia's position and actions.
2. Being able to observe these negotiations also feeds back into how we plan our activities under MYD, MYD's intended outputs and how the organisation plans to use these with the different UNFCCC workstreams. Additionally, MYD can bridge the gap in awareness and knowledge of climate policies among young people, as knowledge of UNFCCC tends to be concentrated among young people in climate-related work, and not widely available and accessible to those outside of the climate space.
3. MYD also had the opportunity to network with other national and international civil society organisations and understand their positions on areas such as gender and youth inclusion. This helped develop our position on the importance and urgency of streamlining these three areas, especially on gender and youth inclusion which were not widely acknowledged at SB60 negotiations. Being able to refine and bring these perspectives into Malaysia's climate planning in any consultative capacity can ensure Malaysia's policy planning is balanced. For example, having this perspective calls for inter-ministerial collaboration on climate action and resilience planning, including the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development (KPWKM) as well as SUHAKAM.
4. On the latter point, young people in Malaysia will be inheriting the consequences of escalating climate impacts, and this is exacerbated when vulnerable intersections are considered. Hence, being able to develop our positions, strengthen them by learning from others and being included in consultative spaces with the NRES, as well as working with other CSOs, can facilitate an accountability mechanism to respond to the urgency of the 1.5°C target when it comes to national climate planning. Continuing the work with MYD can strengthen this accountability mechanism, which will in turn strengthen Malaysia's climate policies, governance and implementation.

In conclusion, the active participation of youth in platforms like SB60 demonstrates the vital role that youth play in shaping climate policy and driving sustainable action. As the future leaders and the generation most affected by climate change, young people bring unique energy, fresh ideas, and a sense of urgency that is often lacking in negotiations. Youth inclusion ensures that climate policies are more equitable, forward-looking, and responsive to the needs of all, especially vulnerable communities. By empowering youth voices in decision-making, we not only address today's climate challenges but also build a resilient and just future for generations

to come. It is essential that this momentum continues, with stronger support for youth involvement at all levels of climate governance.

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