


COP29



Post-COP29 Report

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With contributions from Farhana Shukor

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DISCLAIMER

The views and opinions expressed in this report are attributed to the authors of the Post COP29 Report and may not necessarily reflect the official views of MYD and any other organisations mentioned. Any and all written errors are the authors' own.

Production of the Post-COP29 Report was a deeply collaborative effort among MYD members. Below is a breakdown of the people involved in this process:

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In MYD's continued efforts towards promoting transparency and accountability, disclosures on crowdfunding allocation and expenses coverage have been included as an appendix.

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We welcome any and all constructive feedback on this report. Kindly reach out to us at focalpoint@mydclimate.org for inquiries.

GLOSSARY

AC	Adaptation Committee
ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AILAC	Association of Latin American and Caribbean Countries
BTR	Biennial Transparency Report
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
COP29	29th Conference of Parties
COP30	30th Conference of Parties
CRP	Conference Room Paper
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
L&D	Loss & Damage
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MOI	Means of Implementation
MWP	Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme
MYD	Malaysian Youth Delegation

MYLCOY2024	Malaysian Local Conference of Youth 2024
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NMA	Non-Market Approach
NRES	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability
SB60	60th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies
SB62	62nd session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VCM	Voluntary Carbon Market
YOUNGO	Official youth constituency of the UNFCCC

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INTRODUCTION TO MYD AND COP29

The Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD), established in 2015, is a volunteer-based civil society organisation made up of young passionate Malaysians. MYD plays a dual role in representing Malaysia's youth climate movement and raising awareness of climate policies as an advocacy lever among Malaysians.

As part of MYD's commitment to Malaysian youth representation in climate policy discussions, MYD successfully sent three representatives to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)'s 29th Conference of Parties (COP29), which took place from 11-22 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The delegation included Kieran Li Nair, Co-Focal Point (who also represented the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia); Khalisah Khairina (Lisa), Mitigation Working Group Coordinator; and Hanis Alwani, Media Working Group Coordinator. The delegation was also supported by Farhana Shukor, Advisor, who acted under the capacity of the Loss and Damage Youth Coalition and Khazanah Research Institute at the conference.

The UNFCCC negotiation agendas followed by MYD delegates at COP29 include climate finance (tracked by Farhana), carbon markets under Article 6 (tracked by Kieran), mitigation (tracked by Lisa), and adaptation (tracked by Hanis). MYD outlined these tracks as priority areas through alignment with global discourse during COP29, as well as linkages to Malaysia's own climate agendas. Complementary negotiation tracks attended by MYD representatives over the two weeks include but are not limited to action for climate empowerment, clean development mechanism, as well as response measures in order to form a more holistic view on the conference's progress. They also attended the Group of 77 and China (G77/China) bloc coordination meetings to further understand Global North-South dynamics and priorities within the negotiations.

Aside from this, MYD had the privilege of formally participating in several Blue Zone side events throughout the duration of the conference. MYD representatives moderated two panel sessions at the Malaysian Pavilion, highlighting Malaysia's climate landscape to an international audience. The first session, "When Global Meets Local: Finding Solutions to Planetary Uncertainties", was moderated by Lisa and featured panellists Jessica Beagly from Global Climate Health Alliance, Prof Tan Sri Dr Jemilah Mahmood from Sunway Centre for Planetary Health, and Will Gagnon from Centre for Sustainable Medicine. The discussion focused on addressing global challenges, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, at the intersection of climate, health, and local action.

The second session, "COP29 Reflections and Next Steps on Malaysia's Whole-of-Nation Pathway", saw Kieran moderating a fireside chat with YB Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad, Minister of

Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability (NRES), and Meenakshi Raman, Head of Programmes at Third World Network. The discussion highlighted COP29's progress from government and civil society's perspectives, and explored the roles of state and non-state actors in driving climate action.

MYD was also honoured to participate at the Thailand Pavilion, where Hanis shared the stage with other ASEAN youth leaders from Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Philippines at the "Outcomes of LCOY in ASEAN" side event to discuss Local Conference of Youth (LCOY) outcomes and strategies to strengthen the ASEAN youth climate movement.

As part of the organisation's efforts in bridging youth voices with national representatives, MYD coordinated a bilateral meeting with NRES minister YB Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad, joined by a representative from Youths United for Earth (YUFE) to discuss Malaysian youth interests at COP29, sharing collaborative strategies to empower more young people in the climate space. MYD also organised a session with the official Malaysian delegation (comprising numerous lines of ministries and agencies, including but not limited to NRES, Ministry of Economy, and Malaysian Green Technology and Climate Change Corporation) to share our observations, insights and recommendations at COP29. During this meeting, the government representatives addressed MYD's questions regarding Malaysia's priorities and its participation in international climate governance.

Apart from formal engagements, MYD also networked with other youth groups across Southeast Asia, the Global South and broader climate advocacy scene to gain wide-ranging perspectives on international youth climate advocacy, discussing potential areas of collaboration to strengthen MYD's ongoing work.

With that, MYD's Post-COP29 Report is split into two components:

- **Part A** of the report documents the progress of key negotiations tracked by the delegates at COP29 while observing views from different nations and blocs and thereafter providing their recommendations with relevance to Malaysia's climate policies.
- **Part B** of the report compiles the subsequent discussions hosted at MYD's Post-COP29 Forum, held on 15 February 2025, which brought together representatives from ministries, private sector, civil society and other public interest stakeholders to discuss recommendations for Malaysia's direction in the wake of COP29's outcomes. The discussions are hosted according to the negotiation tracks MYD's delegates followed during the conference, namely mitigation, adaptation, climate finance as well as Article 6. The forum's programme is included in the Appendix II of the report.

Ultimately, the report aims to highlight the role of international cooperation across all levels of stakeholders in shaping local action, and presents policy recommendations from a Malaysian

youth perspective. By capturing these insights, MYD aims to strengthen local youth involvement in climate advocacy, negotiations, and policymaking.

NEGOTIATION TRACK I: FINANCE

- The quantum of the NCQG is insufficient to meet the actual needs of developing countries, including Malaysia.
- The lack of specific subgoals for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage may also lead to imbalanced funding and hinder effective climate action planning.
- The push to expand the NCQG's contributor base to include certain developing countries and the private sector raises concerns on the accountability of developed nations, with risks of allowing potential market influence on climate priorities which could undermine the safeguards of people and nature.

Part A: COP29

This section examines climate finance, specifically the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). The NCQG is the latest effort to establish a financial framework under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support developing countries in addressing climate change. Its origins can be traced back to earlier commitments made by developed countries to assist developing nations in their climate actions.

In 2009, at COP15 in Copenhagen, developed countries pledged to mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020. This commitment was formalised at COP16 in Cancun and was intended to help developing countries mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, despite the report from the OECD, developed countries have never met the USD 100 billion goal, eroding the already fragile trust between developed and developing nations.

Recognising the need for a more robust and ambitious financial framework, the Paris Agreement that was adopted at COP21 in 2015 included a decision to establish a “new collective quantified goal on climate finance”. This decision acknowledged that the USD 100 billion goal was insufficient and that a new goal, taking into account the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries, was required. The NCQG was thus established, with the aim of scaling up financial support and improving the effectiveness of climate finance mechanisms. Negotiations for the NCQG began in 2021 and concluded at COP29 in 2024.

Climate finance is fundamentally about funding projects related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. The NCQG outcome would significantly shape how climate action is financed and implemented through the delivery and mobilisation of climate finance. While the NCQG fulfills the mandate set at COP21 in 2015, its reception among developing countries, Least

Developed Countries (LDCs), and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has been disappointing, primarily due to concerns in the following key areas.

Quantum

A central element of the NCQG is the commitment to mobilise USD 300 billion annually until 2035, alongside an investment aspiration of USD 1.3 trillion. Developed countries have emphasised the USD 300 billion figure, framing it as a tripling of the previous largely unmet USD 100 billion annual goal. However, this amount is a substantial underestimate compared to the estimated USD 5 trillion per year that developed countries owe to developing countries. Furthermore, the USD 1.3 trillion is characterised as an "ambition" or "aim", as reflected in the NCQG text, also known as the "Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T."

Both the committed quantum and the investment aspiration are significantly lower than the actual needs of developing nations. This shortfall will affect the distribution of the USD 300 billion among 155 developing countries, where allocation is supposed to be based on their respective needs. The absence of a robust needs-based assessment in Malaysia complicates efforts to determine the precise funding required to achieve the nation's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), which should reflect increasing ambition with each revision. Consequently, Malaysia will be competing with other developing countries for a limited pool of funds to finance increasingly ambitious climate projects and initiatives.

The most notable element of the NCQG is the quantum, which was set at USD 300 billion per year until 2035 and an investment goal of USD 1.3 trillion. Developed countries and their media lauded the \$300 billion per year goal because it is a tripling of the previous USD 100 billion per year goal that never came to be. Indeed, according to Oxfam International, the true value of climate finance provided in 2020 was estimated to be between USD 21-24.5 billion, far below the reported USD 83.3 billion and the USD 100 billion target. Against this backdrop, the USD 300 billion per year goal is a gross underestimate of what developed countries owe developing countries at USD 5 trillion annually. Furthermore, several contest the wordplay that is involved in the NCQG text, arguing that the USD 1.3 trillion goal can be described as an "ambition" or "aim", which is relatively watered down compared to a "goal", particularly since the NCQG text is also known as the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T".

Both actual and investment quantum goals are severely underestimated, which impacts how the USD 300 billion per year would be divided among 155 developing countries. Allocation from the USD 300 billion would be based on countries' respective needs. However, the lack of needs-based assessment in Malaysia makes it difficult to state how much we would need to achieve our NDC, which also needs to reflect Malaysia's enhanced ambition at every

reiteration. Thus, Malaysia must compete with other developing countries from a small pool of money to finance increasingly ambitious climate projects and initiatives.

Contributor base

Another contentious aspect of the NCQG is the question on which parties should contribute to the committed amount. The Paris Agreement stipulates that developed countries are responsible for providing financial resources to assist developing countries in achieving their climate goals. However, developed countries are now advocating for a broader contributor base in the NCQG, to include developing countries that have experienced recent economic growth. Their rationale is that some developing countries are now financially capable of contributing and are also significant emitters.

This push to expand the contributor base is viewed with concern by many developing countries. They argue that the primary responsibility for climate finance lies with developed countries, given their historical contributions to greenhouse gas emissions and their greater economic capacity. Additionally, some sources indicate that developing countries are already contributing substantially to global climate finance through domestic resource mobilisation, which often goes unreported or unacknowledged in international climate finance accounting.

Developed countries are also pushing for the inclusion of the private sector as a contributor. The private sector is deemed crucial by developed countries to achieving the aspiration of USD 1.3 trillion in investment. However, private sector entities are not Parties to the UNFCCC, nor are they signatories to the Paris Agreement, which implies potentially reduced accountability. Moreover, private sector involvement could steer the types of financial instruments used and the projects funded in developing countries. This could make Malaysia's climate ambitions vulnerable to market forces.

Another contentious issue in the NCQG is which Party ought to contribute to the quantum. Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries are responsible for providing financial resources to developing countries to achieve the latter's climate ambitions. However, in the NCQG, developed countries want the contributor base to include newly rich developing countries with the excuse that some developing countries are now capable of contributing financially to the quantum, and are equally as culpable given their latest sums of emissions.

Developed countries are also keen to include the private sector as a contributor. The inclusion of the private sector has been identified as a necessary player to achieve the USD 1.3 trillion investment goal. However, private sector companies are neither Parties to the Convention nor are they signatories to the Paris Agreement, making them less accountable. Additionally, private sector investment can influence the type of financial instruments used and the projects

financed in developing countries – which can be manifested by skewing market preferences towards certain technologies or sectors over others, irrespective of their strategic importance to Malaysia’s long-term climate resilience and low-carbon development. This would make Malaysia’s climate ambitions susceptible to market forces.

Quality of finance

The quality of finance pertains to the types of financial instruments employed to deliver the USD 300 billion annual commitment. The NCQG text indicates that these instruments, sourced from both public and private entities, are not specified.

The inclusion of diverse financial instruments in climate finance presents several challenges, notably the preference for certain instruments over others, namely market-rate debt which overtakes grants (CPI, 2024). Throughout COP29, developing countries and civil society organisations (CSOs) strongly advocated for grant-based climate finance, rather than loans, because grants do not increase the financial burden on recipient nations. Grants would also enable developing countries to prioritise investments in adaptation and mitigation solutions, which are critical components of climate action.

In contrast, the OECD emphasised the need for international providers to significantly scale up their efforts in adaptation finance and the mobilisation of private finance. However, concerns remain on the terms and conditions of private finance, which may not always be favourable to developing countries.

Given the current preference for loans in climate finance, Malaysia's debt levels could be affected, regardless of any claims about concessional rates offered by the private sector.

The quality of finance refers to the type of financial instruments used to deliver the USD 300 billion per year goal. Based on the text, the instruments to deliver the quantum goal are non-specific from both public and private sources.

There are challenges to including various financial instruments in climate finance, namely a preference for some instruments over others. As it is, 44% of project-level market rate debt in comparison to 6% of grants. Throughout COP29, there was strong advocacy from developing countries and civil society organisations (CSOs) for grant-based climate finance instead of loans, as grants would not present additional financial burdens to developing countries. Grants would also allow developing countries to focus on investing in adaptation and mitigation solutions, which are significant milestones in climate action.

Given developed countries' existing preference for loans to finance climate action, this would impact Malaysia's debt level regardless of how concessional the private sector says it is.

Subgoals

Subgoals, referring to the three pillars of climate action – mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage (L&D) – are notably absent from the NCQG. While mitigation and adaptation are mentioned, L&D is excluded. Subgoals would have provided a framework for measuring the equitable distribution of climate finance across these pillars. Despite an increase in overall climate finance, its allocation remains uneven. Although the text emphasises the need to finance adaptation efforts, alongside mitigation, the absence of specific subgoals hinders the establishment of measurable targets and, by extension, progress in climate action, given the interconnected nature of these three pillars.

The UNFCCC (2024) highlights that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance is aimed at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. To effectively achieve this, a balanced approach to financing mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage is essential.

While the increased emphasis on adaptation finance may benefit Malaysia and its future adaptation projects, the lack of subgoals could complicate the nation's strategic planning for comprehensive climate action.

Conclusion and Recommendations for Malaysian Policymakers

The NCQG, while representing a step forward, falls short in addressing the urgent climate finance needs of developing nations. The insufficient quantum, the debate over contributors, the emphasis on loans over grants, and the absence of clear subgoals pose significant challenges. For Malaysia, these issues could hinder the implementation of ambitious climate action and potentially increase the nation's financial burden.

To ensure Malaysia's climate resilience and sustainable development, and to safeguard the interests of Malaysian youth, the following actions are recommended for policymakers:

1. **Strengthen Needs-Based Assessments:** Conduct comprehensive national assessments to determine the precise financial resources required to achieve Malaysia's enhanced NDCs. This will enable Malaysia to advocate for adequate and equitable climate finance allocation under the NCQG and future financial mechanisms.

Youth should be included in these assessments to ensure their perspectives are considered.

2. **Advocate for Grant-Based Financing:** Actively promote the provision of grant-based climate finance in international forums. Emphasise that grants are essential for facilitating adaptation projects and reducing the debt burden on developing countries. Additionally, the NCQG must adhere to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), reminding developed countries of the different historical contributions to climate change and varying capacities of countries to respond.
3. **Enhance Transparency and Accountability:** Push for greater transparency and accountability in the disbursement of climate finance. This includes advocating for clear reporting mechanisms and robust oversight of private sector involvement, ensuring that climate finance serves the best interests of the country and its citizens.
4. **Establish clear guidelines for private sector involvement:** If private sector contributions are included in the NCQG, stringent guidelines must be established to ensure that they align with the climate priorities of developing countries, do not increase their debt burden, and are subject to robust accountability mechanisms.

Part B: Post-COP29 Forum

The discussion on climate finance highlighted the accessibility of climate finance under the NCQG, which is identified as a complex issue shaped by both institutional frameworks and global systemic barriers. While Malaysia has strong policies which could interest investors for mitigation projects, adaptation policies are yet to be completed. However, even with existing policies and mandatory requirements for climate and sustainability linked financial reporting as highlighted in the National Sustainability Reporting Framework (NSRF), Malaysia still struggles to secure climate funds.

One of the biggest challenges is the lack of a coordinated national strategy, which makes accessibility and application to funds from various sources difficult. Additionally, access to international funds is largely restricted to government agencies, creating barriers for private sector participation. Many corporations, despite their climate-related initiatives, find it difficult to engage with UNFCCC finance mechanisms, raising questions about how private investments can be better integrated into the global and Malaysia's climate finance landscape.

Another critical issue is the definition and classification of climate finance itself. There are growing concerns that some funds are being diluted or miscategorised, meaning that not all reported climate finance is truly directed toward meaningful climate action. This lack of clarity affects the ability of meaningful climate action to acquire funds which in turn sets barriers for implementation. Businesses in Malaysia need to actively penetrate the national, regional and international financiers to allow drastic investment and implementation of green projects.

Meanwhile, at the grassroots level, indigenous communities face significant financial constraints especially for their conservation efforts. Protecting natural ecosystems should not come at the expense of their livelihoods, yet there is insufficient financial support for their sustainable land management practices. These weaknesses highlight the need for more inclusive and equitable climate financing mechanisms that reach those most affected by environmental degradation and are accessible to meaningful climate projects delivering Malaysia international commitments.

Therefore, recommendations compiled from the Post-COP29 Forum discussions are as follows:

1. **Strengthen Regional Collaboration through ASEAN:** Malaysia should actively engage and collaborate within ASEAN frameworks to advocate for more equitable climate finance distribution, leveraging regional platforms to secure fairer access to international funding mechanisms.
2. **Enhance Transparency and Coordination Mechanisms:** A centralised data system for tracking climate finance is needed to allow transparent reporting and publicly accessible

databases should be developed to monitor incoming and outgoing climate-related funds, promoting accountability across sectors.

3. **Implement Targeted Capacity Building Initiatives:** Targeted financial literacy and capacity building programs should be introduced, especially across government agencies, local communities, and the private sector. This will enhance the ability to access, manage, and deploy climate finance effectively.
4. **Ensure Just and Inclusive Climate Finance:** Climate finance mechanisms must prioritise marginalised groups, including indigenous communities engaged in conservation. Policies should be designed to improve social equity by ensuring grassroots participation in climate-related decision-making and financing schemes.
5. **Strengthen Environmental Safeguards Against Greenwashing:** Strict evaluation criteria and monitoring systems should be enforced for all projects categorized under climate finance. Projects falsely labeled as "green" must be scrutinised, and corrective measures taken where necessary to maintain the integrity of Malaysia's climate finance commitments.

NEGOTIATION TRACK II: ADAPTATION

- Means of implementation is a major point of contention in both the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and National Adaptation Plan (NAP) processes. Developing countries continue to urge developed nations to fulfill their commitments by providing vital support, including financial resources, technology transfer, and capacity building, to ensure the effective planning and implementation of adaptation actions.
- It is important for Malaysia to prioritise the development of its National Adaptation Plan (MyNAP) and align it with its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This will help Malaysia effectively articulate its adaptation needs on the international stage, increasing its chances of accessing funding for adaptation projects. By demonstrating a clear and integrated approach, Malaysia can strengthen its position in securing the necessary support to address climate change impacts.
- A manageable set of indicators is crucial for balancing global insights with the capacity of nations – particularly those with limited resources – to track and report progress. This streamlined approach ensures accountability while addressing diverse regional adaptation needs.

Part A: COP29

Climate adaptation has emerged as a critical pillar in global climate action, emphasising the urgency needed to strengthen the resilience of our ecosystems and communities against the impacts of climate change. While mitigation focuses on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, adaptation is equally essential to address and manage existing and future climate impacts.

According to the IPCC, climate change has disrupted global systems through shifting precipitation patterns, cryosphere loss, and prolonged droughts, all of which have led to more frequent and intense climatic extremes. These disruptions have slowed agricultural productivity and left nearly half the world's population facing severe water scarcity. In urban areas, intensified heat waves have worsened air pollution and strained critical infrastructure, including transportation, water sanitation, and energy systems. This has resulted in economic losses, service disruptions, and broader socio-economic impacts. Climate change has also increased the prevalence of food-borne, water-borne, and vector-borne diseases, contributing to rising mortality and morbidity. These interconnected risks cut across all sectors, threatening water and food security, key infrastructure, human health, and ecosystems, ultimately jeopardising global stability and development.

Adaptation is particularly crucial in regions prone to extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, heat waves, and cold waves. These disasters have caused losses

and damage, intensifying food insecurity and climate-induced migration, highlighting the urgent need for effective adaptive strategies.

Before COP29: Adaptation in Climate Negotiations

The Rio Earth Summit (COP1) marked the first reference to adaptation in a global climate policy text with the establishment of the UNFCCC. According to the UNFCCC, adaptation is defined as “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects”. It refers to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or benefits from climate change opportunities.

Even though adaptation was identified early on as equally crucial to mitigation, progress in driving adaptation efforts has been relatively slow, often overshadowed by the emphasis on mitigation efforts. This is partly due to the nature of adaptation, which requires hyper-local and context-specific solutions, making it challenging to establish and agree upon universal targets which complicates global policy efforts. Additionally, adaptation receives significantly less financial support compared to mitigation, as mitigation often offers more immediate and tangible financial returns. The COPs that marked significant adaptation milestones were the COP7 Marrakech Accords, COP13 Bali Action Plan and COP16 Cancun Adaptation Framework.

In 2015, the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP21, marked a significant milestone with a stronger provision for adaptation. Embedded within Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, it emphasises the importance of adaptation in the global response to climate change, setting a collective goal to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability. It calls for country-driven, inclusive, and gender-responsive actions that integrate adaptation into sustainable development and sectoral policies. The article underscores the need to support developing nations through finance, technology, and capacity-building while fostering international cooperation and knowledge-sharing. It encourages nations to communicate their adaptation efforts through National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

At COP29, MYD focused on three key adaptation-related agendas: (1) the Global Goal on Adaptation, (2) National Adaptation Plans, and (3) the Adaptation Committee.

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) is established in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement as an effort to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. At COP28, a pivotal outcome for the GGA was the adoption of the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience. This framework was finalised after extensive ministerial consultations, as negotiators avoided direct engagement over the co-facilitators' text due to political disagreements.

The framework established 11 targets, comprising seven globally relevant thematic targets, aimed at aligning national adaptation priorities with global adaptation objectives while addressing key adaptation gaps. The seven themes are water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty and livelihoods, and culture. The framework also outlines four dimensional targets, reflecting the iterative nature of the adaptation cycle, which are intended to enhance the dynamic process of planning, implementation, and assessment of adaptation efforts. This structured approach bridges the divide between national priorities and global objectives while ensuring a continuous, adaptive response to climate challenges.

The Global Goal on Adaptation is a key focus in the adaptation agenda at COP29. Based on MYD's observations, the outcomes primarily centre on three areas: (1) the UAE-Belém Work Programme, (2) transformational adaptation, and (3) *Baku Adaptation Roadmap & Baku Adaptation High-Level Dialogue*. These outcomes will be further detailed in the following sections.

UAE-Belém Work Programme on Indicators

The UAE-Belém Work Programme is an initiative launched by the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience to identify and develop relevant indicators and potentially quantified elements for measuring progress achieved towards the 11 targets of the GGA, as mandated in Paragraph 39 of the text.

At COP29, the discussion on the UAE-Belém Work Programme was marked by several contentious issues, particularly regarding the inclusion of Means of Implementation (MOI) indicators and the overwhelming number of proposed indicators for tracking adaptation progress. These debates underscored the complexities of addressing adaptation equitably and effectively at a global scale.

Means of Implementation Targets

The inclusion of Means of Implementation (MOI) targets was a contentious issue during the discussions at COP29. These MOI targets are crucial in ensuring that developing countries receive the necessary resources like finance, capacity building, and technology transfer to successfully plan and implement their adaptation strategies. Without these indicators, it becomes difficult to track whether the required resources are adequately being provided and allocated to support the vulnerable nations effectively.

The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience which was adopted at COP28 represented a significant step in addressing adaptation needs. However, the language on MOI was criticised as vague, failing to adequately address the persistent concerns about the lack of financial support and the unequal distribution of resources for adaptation. Without clear indicators for MOI, developing countries' accessibility to critical financial resources would remain uncertain, potentially jeopardising the success of their adaptation plans.

The debate over MOI indicators led to a divergence among countries, with developed Parties such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union (EU), and Canada displaying resistance to the inclusion of such indicators. Their opposition could have stemmed from concerns over the implications these indicators would have on financial reporting, and their potential in creating additional financial obligations. Developed countries were wary of binding commitments that could require them to increase their contributions or undergo increased scrutiny over their adaptation financing. In contrast, the United Kingdom (UK) adopted a more conciliatory stance, signaling openness to further discussions on the matter. The UK's approach suggested a willingness to compromise, recognising the importance of addressing developing countries' concerns while also acknowledging the practical limitations of binding financial commitments.

Another key frustration for many developing nations was the subtle shift in language from “means of implementation” to “enablers of implementation” within the official texts. This change was perceived by many as a dilution of commitment, as the term "enablers" might encompass additional elements including governance, transparency, and anti-corruption. Developing countries feared that this shift would reduce the focus on accountability for financial contributions, potentially hindering their ability to secure the funding and resources necessary for adaptation. This change in language, therefore, raised significant concerns about the lack of clarity around the financial and technical support that vulnerable nations require.

In conclusion, the inclusion of MOI indicators in the adaptation work programme remains crucial in ensuring accountability and adequate support for developing countries. However, the ongoing divergence of perspectives between developed and developing nations, combined with the weakening of language around MOI, poses a challenge to the effectiveness of adaptation efforts under the UNFCCC climate regime.

Overwhelming Numbers of Indicators

Another significant issue that emerged during COP29 was the overwhelming volume of proposed indicators for measuring progress toward the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Prior to the conference, Parties and non-Party stakeholders submitted an overwhelming total of 5,304 indicators. This extensive list, reflecting the broad and ambitious scope of adaptation goals, underscored the importance of comprehensive tracking of progress across multiple dimensions of climate adaptation.

However, the volume of proposed indicators posed significant challenges for the negotiation process and the practical implementation of the GGA. The relevance and context-specificity of the proposed indicators also created additional complications. Given the wide diversity of adaptation contexts globally, indicators that are standardised at a global level may not capture the unique national circumstances and priorities of each country. Furthermore, despite the sheer amount of indicators compiled, some countries further suggested indicators relevant to their needs, such as reference to unique ecosystems and indigenous communities during the negotiation. Developing countries argued that indicators should be flexible enough to adapt to local needs while still providing meaningful insights on global progress.

A large number of indicators would place a burden on resource-constrained nations. Many developing nations are already grappling with limited financial, technical, and human resources, making the task of reporting on a large and diverse set of indicators financially daunting and taxing. Without sufficient support, they are unable to effectively monitor and report on the progress of their adaptation efforts, undermining the effectiveness of the GGA as a tool for global climate resilience.

Additionally, a large volume of proposed indicators may also lead to the risk of double counting. Many of the proposed indicators overlapped with those in existing frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This redundancy raised concerns that tracking progress on multiple, overlapping indicators would lead to inefficiencies, confusion, and duplication of efforts. It also suggested a need for clearer definitions and coordination between various international frameworks to ensure that monitoring and reporting efforts are streamlined and complementary. This further complicated the process of narrowing down the list of indicators, as the need to balance global comparability with national adaptability was a central point of contention.

In response to these challenges, COP29 concluded with a mandate to streamline the indicators. By COP30, Parties are expected to finalise a manageable set of 100 globally applicable indicators and a menu capturing different adaptation contexts. This streamlined approach reduces the burden on resource-constrained nations while ensuring that the selected indicators still provide meaningful and comprehensive insights into global adaptation progress.

to strike a balance between the need for robust global reporting and the practicalities of implementation.

The discussions and debates surrounding the adoption and refinement of indicators at COP29 also underscore the ongoing challenges in fostering equity and inclusivity in global adaptation efforts. Resolving these contentious issues will be critical in ensuring that the adaptation work programme reflects the diverse needs and realities of all Parties, especially those most vulnerable to climate impacts. Additionally, the process highlights the importance of building trust and consensus among Parties to achieve shared goals of climate resilience and sustainability.

Transformational Adaptation

At COP29, another key topic raised in GGA negotiations was the issue of transformational adaptation. IPCC defines transformational adaptation as “adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a social-ecological system in anticipation of climate change and its impacts.” This concept involves deep and long-term systemic changes to the way societies and ecosystems operate to cope with climate change compared to incremental adaptation.

As transformational adaptation extends beyond minor adjustments, it is increasingly recognised as essential for addressing intolerable risks that incremental measures fail to reduce, owing to the nature of incremental adaptation that are fragmented and only focuses on planning rather than implementation. Transformational adaptation is particularly crucial when existing adaptation efforts reach their soft limits, especially in overcoming socio-economic and governance challenges. By fundamentally incorporating a more integrated and systemic approach to adaptation, transformational adaptation offers a pathway to tackling complex, interconnected issues, such as the food-energy-water-health nexus or the intersection of air quality and climate risks, which are particularly prominent in urban areas. This is especially relevant in low-income and developing countries, where socio-economic disparities exacerbate climate risks.

At COP29, groups such as AILAC (Association of Latin American and Caribbean Countries), SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and Australia strongly advocated for the urgent need to focus on large-scale, system-wide changes to strengthen resilience against worsening climate impacts. However, some developing countries voiced concerns that transformational adaptation should not overshadow other established adaptation approaches. They argued that incremental adaptation and long-term adaptation strategies still require greater attention, as these approaches remain under-prioritised despite their importance in addressing the immediate challenges faced by many vulnerable nations. Furthermore, the reservation against

this approach also stemmed from the lack of clarity about transformational adaptation itself, which can further delay the implementation of adaptation efforts.

The discussions on transformational adaptation at COP29 were marked by frustration and challenges. A key issue was the limited time given to Parties to review the technical report on transformational adaptation which was released too close to the negotiations, hence providing insufficient time for thorough review and discussions. In conclusion, the final text recognised the need for balanced approaches that include both transformational and incremental adaptation will be key in achieving the adaptation goals set out in the Global Goal on Adaptation. Further, ensuring equitable participation and adequate resources for both types of adaptation will be critical in ensuring that all countries, particularly the vulnerable nations enhance build their climate resilience

Baku Adaptation Roadmap & Baku Adaptation High-Level Dialogue

Paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5 outlines key operational aspects of GGA and its connection to future Global Stocktake (GST) processes. It highlights five key areas: “exchanging knowledge and experiences on implementing the UAE Framework”, “identifying potential inputs for future GSTs”, “enhancing understanding of regional risks under different temperature scenarios”, “collaborating with scientific bodies to support implementation”, and “developing terms and a timeline for reviewing the framework”. A significant outcome of discussions on this paragraph was the launch of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap which is supposed to advance these priorities, however, the modalities around this roadmap is yet to be decided.

Additionally, the establishment of the Baku Adaptation High-Level Dialogues at COP29 marks another major milestone. This platform is designed to enhance the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience by facilitating discussions on strengthening adaptation efforts. With the UAE-Belém Work Programme set to conclude in 2025 at COP30, the alignment of this work programme with the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the High-Level Dialogues ensures sustained momentum beyond COP30. This continuity is critical in addressing the persistent financial gap of adaptation, as adaptation continues to receive significantly less financial support.

Other Contentious Points within the GGA Discussion

Another key issue that emerged during the GGA negotiations was the involvement of the IPCC in the decision-making process, which sparked mixed reactions among developed and developing countries. Japan strongly opposed the idea of establishing a task force led by the IPCC, however Japan emphasised the need for more guidance and support to ensure an effective collaboration between the scientific community and Parties. On the other hand, developing countries, including the LDCs and South Africa, supported the idea of directly involving the IPCC in the adaptation process. Their position was grounded in the belief that the

best available science, which the IPCC can provide, is crucial for informing adaptation actions and ensuring that countries are prepared for climate risks they face. The IPCC's scientific expertise would lend greater credibility and effectiveness to the adaptation process by providing robust data and recommendations which could help in formulating practical and evidence-based solutions.

Another contentious issue that arose during the GGA discussions was the role of the private sector in driving adaptation efforts. Japan strongly advocated for greater involvement of the private sector as they believe the private sector can scale up adaptation solutions, provide innovation, and mobilise financial resources. However, developing countries expressed reservations about the private sector's involvement in adaptation as they are not obligated to support adaptation efforts. Therefore, relying too heavily on the private sector could put vulnerable nations at a disadvantage, as the private sector may prioritise high-return investments, potentially neglecting the most vulnerable regions or populations. This concern underscores the need for public sector leadership in ensuring that adaptation efforts are inclusive, equitable, and focused on those most at risk from climate change impacts.

These debates highlight the tension between science-driven and market-driven approaches to adaptation, and reflect broader challenges in aligning global adaptation priorities with the capabilities and responsibilities of different actors including scientific institutions, governments, and the private sector.

National Adaptation Plans

The National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) process is essential for helping countries, particularly those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, prepare for and build resilience against the increasingly severe climate risks they face by identifying, prioritising and implementing adaptation actions. The goal is to develop comprehensive, context-specific strategies that can address both immediate and long-term climate risks while integrating adaptation measures into broader national development planning that protect populations, ecosystems and economies.

Despite their importance, progress on NAPs has been slow, with some countries facing significant barriers, such as limited resources, technical capacity, and financial support. At COP29, discussions on NAPs were dominated by debates originating from the G77 and China bloc, a group representing developing countries. The bloc expressed dissatisfaction with a text produced by the co-facilitators before COP29, criticising it for its imbalance and its inability to reflect developing nations' adaptation challenges, needs and priorities. They also refused to proceed with the discussion, voicing their disappointment with the approach while insisting that their concerns be addressed.

Furthermore, developing countries demanded for financial resources, capacity building and technology transfer from the developed countries to support the development and implementation of NAPs. Insufficient provision of means of implementation hinders the overall effectiveness of the NAPs process and limits parties ability to enhance their climate resilience.

By the end of COP29, 62 countries had submitted their NAPs. However, the participation of developed countries in this process remained notably low, with only New Zealand and Canada having submitted their NAPs, and the remaining 60 being developing countries. This discrepancy highlights the lack of commitment from developed countries in formalising their adaptation strategies and reflects the need for stronger action from developed countries to support adaptation efforts globally.

Adaptation Committee

The Adaptation Committee (AC) was established during COP16 to promote the implementation of stronger adaptation actions by acting as the voice to escalate countries' adaptation demands. At COP29, there were two agenda items raised concerning the Adaptation Committee: (1) Report of Adaptation Committee 2023 and 2024; and (2) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee.

Report of the Adaptation Committee

The Report of the Adaptation Committee at COP29 highlights both the recognition of the committee's significant contributions and the challenges it faced during negotiations. In the session, Parties unanimously acknowledged the AC's work in supporting Parties' adaptation efforts, especially in areas such as mapping indicator groups and conducting capacity-building workshops.. However, as the discussions unfolded, Parties raised concerns about areas for improvement, particularly the lack of diversity within the AC. Diversity and inclusivity within the AC could strengthen their work and ensure representation of a broader range of perspectives, especially from vulnerable regions.

Unfortunately, the discussion stalled due to several events of procedural ambiguities, delaying the negotiation until SB62 in 2025. From an observer's perspective, this raises significant concerns about transparency and a lack of trust between the negotiators and the secretariat facilitating the process. The lack of procedural clarity, specifically regarding the role of co-facilitators and the legal status of negotiation texts undermines confidence in a fair and effective negotiation. For future sessions, it will be crucial to establish a more robust procedural framework to prevent such confusion and ensure that the negotiation process remains inclusive, efficient, and fair. Without this clarity, trust between Parties may continue to erode, hindering meaningful progress on key climate adaptation issues.

CASE STUDY: PROCEDURAL AMBIGUITY STALLS NEGOTIATIONS

Given the complexity of climate negotiations, where diverse stakeholders with varying interests must reach consensus, well-defined procedures help maintain order, prevent unnecessary disputes, and keep discussions focused on substantive issues. However, more often than not, Parties lack clarity regarding procedural matters, which can derail discussions and shift attention away from critical negotiations.

This was the case during the AC's Report negotiations, where the session initially proceeded without major issues, but tensions escalated when the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) refused to approve the informal note produced by the co-facilitators. This note had been previously discussed and engaged with by Parties during the early stages of COP29. The AGN argued that the informal note lacked legal status and insisted that discussions should only proceed with the Conference Room Paper (CRP) that they had submitted. This disagreement over the legal status of the texts caused a stall in the negotiations.

When it was clarified that neither the CRP nor the informal note carried legal weight, the co-facilitators proposed drafting a new text to advance the process. However, the AGN rejected this proposal, asserting that they had not authorised the co-facilitators to produce any new text. This led to further confusion and became more complicated when the Norwegian negotiators clarified that co-facilitators do not require a formal mandate from Parties to produce a text. This clarification, rather than resolving the issue, exacerbated the confusion and delayed the process.

Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee

The discussion at COP29 regarding the AC's progress began productively, but it stalled until the session's conclusion. Subsequently, an item of note was suggested by the Norwegian negotiators to allow both the COP and CMA to review the progress of the AC. However, the unclear intention behind this proposal raised concerns and questions, particularly from the Arab Group and ALLAC. They questioned the practicality of this dual review process and whether it might lead to conflicts in priorities. On one hand, the dual review process could offer significant benefits, including increased accountability and better coordination between the two bodies.

However, there are several drawbacks to this approach. One concern is that the dual review process could lead to duplication of efforts, with both bodies reviewing the same progress. This could add to the burden on developing countries, which are already grappling with limited resources, and create inefficiencies in the adaptation process. Moreover, the dual review process might lead to the fragmentation of global adaptation strategies, as the COP and CMA

may focus on different aspects of adaptation, causing misalignment in goals. This might cause bias among the Parties and could further divide them and delay the decision making process. To maximise the effectiveness of this dual review process, it is essential to streamline processes and clarify the roles of both the COP and CMA. Clear delineation of responsibilities would help prevent overlap, reduce confusion, and ensure that the review process remains focused and efficient. Additionally, it is crucial that the local contexts and urgent adaptation needs of vulnerable communities are not lost in the global review process. By balancing the accountability of both the COP and CMA, and making sure that the reviews are complementary rather than duplicative, the process can contribute to more effective adaptation actions globally.

In conclusion, while the dual review process offers a potential opportunity for coordinated adaptation action, its effectiveness depends on the careful balance between global alignment and the specific needs of vulnerable communities. Streamlining the review process, clarifying roles, and ensuring that adaptation strategies remain flexible and responsive to local realities will be critical for the future of adaptation under the UNFCCC climate regime.

Overall Reflection on Adaptation

Adaptation at the Global Level

MOIs remain as one of the biggest barriers to adaptation, especially for developing countries. This is evident as developing countries are not only demanding a more stable provision of MOI support but also calling for a mechanism to track and ensure responsible contributions from developed countries, holding them accountable. Furthermore, the dilution of terms, coupled with an unmanageable set of indicators, could further burden developing countries which already lack the resources to plan and implement adaptation efforts. These challenges can hinder countries from effectively communicating their adaptation needs.

Negotiations have also highlighted the importance of transformational adaptation as a solution to soft adaptation limits and maladaptation, both of which could arise when adaptation efforts focus only on short-term challenges rather than long-term resilience. However, due to resource constraints, there must be a balance between ambition and feasibility to ensure an inclusive mobilisation of resources. Additionally, delays in the negotiation process have been attributed to a lack of integrity and clarity among negotiators.

Recommendations for Malaysia

1. Malaysia needs to **prioritise the development of its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to systematically identify climate risks and adaptation needs**. Currently, Malaysia has secured a EUR 2.8 million grant from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for the

formulation of the National Adaptation Plan (MyNAP) for Malaysia. As of today, formulation of MyNAP focuses on 5 priority sectors: public health, infrastructure & cities, water & coastal resources, agriculture & food security, and forestry & biodiversity. However, there seems to be lack of attention in addressing the loss of cultural heritage and poverty eradication, which are also thematic targets outlined in the GGA. Malaysia is recommended to take into account these areas as well considering climate disasters have always caused destruction and in most cases, led to climate migration which often affects the low-income communities. Clearly articulating these needs will enhance communication at the international level, unlocking financial opportunities to support adaptation efforts effectively.

2. Malaysia should **learn from successful adaptation projects by examining its challenges, solutions, and financial structures**. Successful projects locally, regionally and internationally could provide insights on how an effective adaptation project could help in addressing local challenges. One local adaptation project that could serve as a model for Malaysia is the Penang Nature-Based Climate Adaptation Project, which received a grant worth USD 10 million to implement a whole-of-society approach to address urban heat island issues in Georgetown. Understanding the financial architecture behind these projects can provide valuable insights into securing funding and optimizing resource allocation. This knowledge will help Malaysia design more effective and sustainable adaptation strategies while navigating barriers to implementation, such as unlocking access to resources through bilateral or multilateral partnerships and international financial mechanisms.
3. Malaysia should **invest in local research to explore how transformational adaptation can be effectively implemented within the country**. While the concept is still evolving at the international level, local studies are crucial to assess whether this approach offers more benefits than harm, especially to our environment and communities. Given Malaysia's diverse geographical and socio-economic landscape, context-specific research can provide insights into the potential risks and opportunities of transformational adaptation. Relying solely on international guidance may overlook our unique needs and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, as new concepts in climate policy often emerge and shift attention away from existing, proven solutions, a locally grounded understanding of transformational adaptation will help ensure that it complements, rather than distracts from current adaptation efforts.
4. Lastly, Malaysia must **leverage its ASEAN chairmanship to advocate for stronger regional support for adaptation**. Currently, ASEAN is underrepresented in the development of the UAE Framework indicators, with only one expert from Singapore. Malaysia must leverage on its ASEAN chairmanship and push for greater ASEAN representation in global adaptation discussions, ensuring that the region's unique vulnerabilities and needs are adequately addressed. Strengthening ASEAN's collective

voice on adaptation can also help unlock more financial and technical support, benefiting Malaysia and its regional counterparts.

Part B: Post-COP29 Forum

The discussion in the adaptation breakout room explored strengths and weaknesses of the current policy in enabling adaptation efforts in Malaysia, followed by opportunities and threats. One of the major challenges in Malaysia's climate adaptation landscape is the misalignment between federal and state governments. While the federal government sets national climate policies and frameworks, the success of implementation depends heavily on the state level, especially since adaptation often requires localised solutions. However, the divergence in priorities across governance levels has made it difficult to translate national goals into meaningful local action. The top-down approach commonly adopted not only diminishes the role of local communities but also contributes to fragmented efforts.

Policy enforcement also remains weak. Projects continue to be approved or renewed in disaster-prone areas due to lenient environmental regulations and oversight and the absence of the 'polluter pays' principle removes a key mechanism for accountability. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), which are intended to safeguard communities and ecosystems, are frequently undermined by lax requirements. In many cases, affected stakeholders are not meaningfully consulted, and even when public reviews are mandated, EIA reports are not easily accessible. A shortage of qualified local experts further leads to low-quality assessments, weakening the credibility and reliability of environmental governance. EIA also lacks assessment for social aspects of the project development, resulting in local communities being the affected stakeholders during project development.

Compounding these governance challenges is the lack of data availability necessary to assess climate risks comprehensively. The issue is not merely a result of limited resources, but also of an unwillingness among key data holders to share information. This restricts relevant stakeholders, including local authorities and planners, from making informed decisions. Without reliable and accessible data, adaptation planning becomes poorly targeted.

Vulnerable areas such as the peatland and mangrove were also not given enough attention despite their significance in protecting our ecosystem from disasters such as floods and biodiversity losses.

Recommendations

1. Strengthen coordination between the federal and state governments to bridge policy-implementation gaps in adaptation. Clear alignment and consistent policy enforcement will ensure that national adaptation strategies are responsive to local needs and vulnerabilities.
2. Foster institutional capacity and improve governance frameworks through inclusive stakeholder engagement. Participation from diverse sectors and industries enhances capacity-building, promotes knowledge transfer, and supports more holistic, community-driven adaptation actions.
3. Leverage Malaysia's biodiversity by enhancing the eco-tourism sector with educational elements that highlight nature-based solutions and climate adaptation. This approach can increase public awareness while generating sustainable economic opportunities for local communities.
4. Incorporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria into both upstream and downstream Environmental Impact Assessments. This ensures that climate and social risks are assessed throughout the full life cycle of development projects—not just at the initial planning stage.
5. Introduce a carbon tax or similar financial disincentives for developers operating in disaster-prone areas. This would discourage unsustainable development and generate funds for adaptation and resilience-building initiatives.
6. Enhance partnerships between academic institutions and industries to promote research and innovation in climate adaptation technologies, data-sharing platforms, and local capacity-building programmes.

NEGOTIATION TRACK III: MITIGATION

- Despite the Paris Agreement's goals and the NDC process, current national commitments fall significantly short of the emissions cuts needed to limit warming to 1.5°C, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced ambition and implementation, a key focus of the MWP.
- Negotiations surrounding the MWP at COP29 revealed tensions between developed and developing countries regarding the integration of Global Stocktake outcomes and the operationalisation of the work program, particularly concerning financial support and the consideration of national circumstances.
- Discussions on NDC features also exposed a divide, with developed nations advocating for more specific and quantifiable targets for greater comparability, while developing countries emphasized the nationally-determined nature and the importance of flexibility and adequate means of implementation.

Part A: COP29

Mitigation has been the main focus of the UNFCCC in addressing the climate crisis caused by rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since the Industrial Revolution. Throughout the years, mitigation has been implemented under the then-Kyoto Protocol and superseded by the Paris Agreement, with the guiding principle of developed countries leading the way through “economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”. Given that the Paris Agreement is the main regulatory instrument in responding to climate change, this section will be structured around this legally-binding UN treaty.

The Paris Agreement aims to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” To achieve this, the treaty requires all 195 Parties to set a national ambition for reducing emissions, in the form of a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) that is to be submitted every five years with increasing ambition. The UNFCCC’s NDC Synthesis Report found that full implementation of the latest NDCs would reduce emissions to 5.3% by 2030 compared to 2019 levels, while NDCs without conditional elements could lead to a 1.4% increase. These targets fall far short of the IPCC’s requirement to cut emissions by at least 43% to stay below 1.5°C, instead putting the world on track for 2.5-2.9°C warming by 2100, prompting developed countries to enhance reductions and increase climate finance for developing nations.

This section primarily discusses the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP), the NDC features, the interconnections and dependencies in achieving the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement, and mitigation as a whole. Following COP29,

these agenda items remain central to strengthening global mitigation efforts, as countries assess progress, refine commitments, and address gaps in their ambitions to align with the latest climate science. Malaysia's approach to mitigation will also be aligned with this global perspective while it addresses its national policies, priorities, and actions.

Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP)

MWP was established to enhance mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade. It serves as a platform for Parties to share best practices on mitigation efforts based on the selected topic by the Chair Committee through two mandated annual global dialogues and two investment-focused events alongside thematic discussions, summary reports, and presentations at annual ministerial roundtables on pre-2030 ambition. The modalities of this work programme started at COP26 and was finalised at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh. Since then, there have been two topics which have been selected, which are “Accelerating Just Energy Transition”, the topic for 2023, and “Cities: Buildings and Urban Systems” the topic for 2024. The topic for 2024 included spatial planning and low-carbon infrastructure, electrification and switching to net-zero emission resources, and enhancing carbon storage through green and blue infrastructure. A key challenge lies in identifying how the MWP can effectively build on existing efforts to trigger the rapid scale-up of near-term mitigation actions.

From an observer's perspective, the negotiations of the MWP started off on the second day of COP29 in a sombre mood that might have been influenced by the unsatisfying conclusion at the intersessional meeting in Bonn prior to COP29, as the agenda item could not be agreed upon (Rule 16). The negotiations started with the Parties voicing out what they hoped to be a favourable outcome for MWP at COP29. The Republic of Korea aptly reminded the room that “Our work here in Baku may salvage or kill the MWP” which was followed by a round of applause from the room. This was echoed by several developed countries that emphasised the importance of this agenda item in achieving the 1.5°C target. Across the two weeks at COP29, eight sessions were conducted which resulted in a draft decision. Several significant themes were noted during the discussion of the MWP at COP29, and will be further elaborated below.

Balancing Ambition and Feasibility

In the context of the Paris Agreement's long-term goals and informed by the findings of the Global Stocktake (GST), MWP serves as a platform to navigate the complexities of translating enhanced ambition in NDCs into practical and achievable implementation strategies. GST serves as a critical reference point, taking stock of the current progress of collective actions within the framework of the Paris Agreement, while also providing opportunities to enhance ambitions. However, as noted from the outcomes of the first GST (GST 1.0), efforts made by Parties are insufficient to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. With the upcoming third NDC (NDC 3.0) submission cycle in 2025 and insights from GST 1.0, there is mounting

pressure to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation. Some Parties underlined that actions should be guided by the latest and best available science, having 1.5°C-aligned NDCs, along with deep, sustained GHG reductions. Flexibility in implementation however, should not be sidelined, as echoed by the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and several other developing nations who highlighted the structural barriers to implementation, particularly insufficient financial support and capacity gaps. MWP must facilitate its implementation while respecting national circumstances and addressing the financing barriers in operationalisation. Another operationalisation matter proposed was the utilisation of regional dialogues, which could better address country-specific needs to ensure relevant solutions that acknowledge national circumstances and priorities. Bridging the discussion between ambition and flexibility, these two approaches can complement each other by incorporating flexibility as an element within ambitions, and achieving these ambitions through collaboration, guided by the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

Role of the Global Stocktake (GST) in MWP

The role of GST 1.0 within MWP was highly contested on whether the GST outcomes should be integrated into MWP outcomes. For context, the establishment of MWP stated that it would serve in a manner that complements the GST. Thus, in the context of mitigation the GST informs MWP by providing a basis for enhancing ambition, addressing gaps, and guiding the implementation. However, the integration of GST into the MWP was a highly contentious issue in the discussion room. On one end, developed countries (United States, the European Union, Australia and among others) encouraged the integration of GST outcomes while the other end, developing countries (Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), the Arab Group, and Bolivia) wanted limited or no integration of GST in the MWP. Developed nations emphasised the need for this integration as they continue to raise their ambitions and actions to align with GST outcomes. However, this integration faced resistance from the developing nations, who feared the imposition of top-down targets that could undermine the Paris Agreement's bottom-up approach. Another concern was the risk of overly prescriptive targets which fail to consider the equity principle and national circumstances. While everyone agrees on the importance of addressing climate change and the need for action, the path to achieve this is highly contested.

Means of Implementation

Recognising that the practical realisation of ambitions highlighted by NDCs are contingent upon sufficient Means of Implementation and Support (MOIS), MWP's effectiveness in driving climate action for the Global South is inextricably tied to addressing these fundamental enabling factors. Challenges faced by the Global South in achieving its national ambitions primarily revolved around securing adequate financial and technical support for the transition. Whilst in theory, the push for scaling up mitigation action would look perfectly on track to

achieve a 1.5°C-aligned pathway, the practical implementation of these ‘ambitions’ remains difficult especially for developing nations. Concerns have also been raised over the attempts towards a top-down approach that could disproportionately burden developing countries. The effectiveness of the work programme is being hindered by the lack of finance, a critical enabler for successful implementation of these ambitions. While developed nations pushed for stronger ambitions and commitments, the feasibility of these ambitions needs to be realistically assessed. Though finance technically falls outside of the MWP’s mandate, it remains an ever-present concern throughout the negotiations. After all, ambition without sufficient financial support is meaningless, especially for the Global South.

Inclusivity and Scope

As part of the MWP’s mandate to conduct Global Dialogues and Investment-Focused Events annually, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) proposed holding regional dialogues that address region-specific needs and priorities. However, this suggestion was opposed by certain blocs and Parties from the developing nations, who preferred to retain a global platform to ensure inclusivity and avoid fragmentation of perspectives. The global approach was favoured by these Parties as it ensures a broad range of perspectives. These Parties are concerned that regional dialogues might be leveraged to impose mitigation targets unfairly. Notably, the proposal for regional dialogues were mainly supported by developed countries, highlighting a divergence in perspectives on how best to conduct these dialogues. This raises critical questions about the purpose of the Regional Climate Weeks, which are supposed to be conducted annually. A vital question is whether these dialogues are duplicating efforts, or do they inadvertently highlight the irrelevance of regional dialogues within MWP framework?

Features of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

NDCs represent every Party’s national ambitions that are prepared and communicated in pursuit of the collective goal of the Paris Agreement. As defined in the Paris Agreement, these contributions are nationally-determined, respecting national circumstances, and must be updated every five years with increasing highest possible ambition. The description of what constitutes an NDC is referred to as the "features of NDCs", reinforcing a bottom-up approach that allows countries flexibility in defining their own climate goals while ensuring global progress.

NDCs typically consist of targets which include mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and transparency measures which are crucial in determining whether the cumulative targets of Parties could meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting temperature rise. In order to enhance accountability and ambition, the NDC cycle follows a structured timeline to allow the assessment of the collective progress towards global climate

goals, known as GST. Meanwhile at COP29, Parties will consider further guidance on NDC features, alongside the submission of the first round of Biennial Transparency Reports (BTR), which track progress in implementation. Then, by February 2025, Parties must submit new or updated NDCs, informed by the outcomes of the GST, ensuring increased ambition (it should be noted that this deadline has since been extended due to many Parties requiring additional time and capacity to do so). Therefore, this section highlights several key themes within the negotiations which have been identified and discussed as follows:

Necessity of Additional Features and Debate on Over-prescriptive Targets

A significant point of contention in the negotiations stemmed from the fundamental disagreement over the nature and scope of NDCs and the role of having further guidance on it. Part of the tension surrounding this agenda item centered on whether further discussion on additional features was necessary to enhance a Party's NDC. Developed nations (Australia, United Kingdom, Japan, and European Union among many others) advocated for additional features with more specific elements in NDCs, such as having quantified targets, providing absolute emission reductions, including timelines, and alignment with GST outcomes. They viewed these additional elements as crucial for enhancing ambition and establishing comparability among Parties. On the other hand, developing nations argued that the Paris Agreement had already provided adequate and comprehensive guidance on NDC features, and that introducing additional guidance could undermine the voluntary and nationally-determined nature of these contributions. They viewed the agenda item as redundant, unnecessary, and potentially counterproductive to the spirit of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, additional features or guidance could lead to over-prescriptive targets that would undermine the nature of NDCs. This could be further exacerbated by the lack of means of implementing these ambitions.

Overall, the developing nations strongly resisted additional features that might impose rigid requirements and fail to consider the diverse socio-economic conditions and capacities of different Parties. Nonetheless, given the Party-driven approach of these discussions, the persistent lack of consensus and the time constraint, the Parties agreed to postpone and continue this discussion at CMA 8 in November 2026. This decision was seen as a pragmatic compromise to keep the issue on the table while acknowledging the lack of agreement. While some nations emphasised the need for expedited discussions to inform the next round of NDCs, others advocated for a delay to avoid overlapping with other agenda items, marking the challenge of balancing urgency and efficiency in the negotiations. Should NDCs be strengthened through additional elements which allows further standardisation and comparability, or should they remain flexible to reflect national priorities and circumstances? This question will likely remain a critical issue in future negotiations.

Adaptation Co-Benefits

While discussions about NDCs focused heavily on mitigation, many Parties also highlighted the critical importance of adaptation and its associated co-benefits. There was a strong push to ensure that adaptation received adequate attention alongside mitigation, particularly given the growing vulnerability of developing nations to climate impacts. However, concerns were raised about imposing specific, prescriptive targets that could hinder national flexibility, especially for countries with differing capacities and priorities. Several Parties emphasised the synergies between adaptation and mitigation, noting that integrated approaches such as mangrove restoration and sustainable agricultural practices not only reduce emissions but also enhance climate resilience.

Overall Reflection on Mitigation as a Key Driver

Mitigation at the Global Level

Global mitigation efforts are crucial in addressing the climate crisis, with the Paris Agreement serving as the primary framework for action. While there is considerable momentum to increase ambition, particularly through the NDCs and MWP, challenges remain in balancing ambition with feasibility. Concerns regarding adequacy of financial support, national circumstances, and capacity in developing countries add complexity to the conversations surrounding mitigation. Despite these hurdles, there is growing recognition that mitigation must accommodate both ambitious climate goals while addressing the unique needs of different nations, following the principle of CBDR. Therefore, mitigation actions must be framed within a broader and more inclusive approach that acknowledges the varying capacities and needs of developing countries. While the push for universal, prescriptive targets is important to drive ambition, it must not undermine the flexibility central to the Paris Agreement's bottom-up approach. Countries must be empowered to pave their own paths to decarbonisation, based on their national priorities, capacities, and the financial and technological support available to them.

What Does Mitigation as A Driver Mean for Malaysia?

1. As a developing country, Malaysia must balance **its economic growth with climate ambition**. While the country remains committed to scaling up its climate ambitions, there is a need to identify adequate and supportive financing mechanisms, and capacity-building strategies essential for transitioning to low-carbon pathways. Therefore, utilising the MWP to the fullest extent is beneficial in bridging these gaps.
2. Additionally, **regional cooperation through the UNFCCC process, or other multilateral efforts could serve as a key opportunity to accelerate climate action** within the ASEAN region. While climate impacts and actions might differ within this

region, having a united front regionally would aid in accessing financial support, capacity building, and technologies, as well as sharing resources and expertise. Furthermore, implementation of climate action can be accelerated by sending stronger signals to the world that ASEAN is an investable market with great support for sustainability and environmental integrity. Malaysia's 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship offers an opportunity to strategically establish groundwork for a unified ASEAN bloc specifically within the UNFCCC context. This would focus on deliberate formation of a stronger, more coordinated ASEAN presence and negotiating stance within the UNFCCC. It aims beyond existing collaborations to foster a cohesive regional identity on critical negotiation tracks, such as those concerning Article 6 on carbon markets, the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), and common reporting frameworks. Laying the groundwork for this enhanced regional unity within the UNFCCC could significantly amplify ASEAN's influence and ensure its collective priorities are effectively represented in global climate governance.

3. As Malaysia prepares for the upcoming round of NDC 3.0, it is crucial to strengthen its commitment while maintaining the principles of CBDR. Malaysia's commitment to an unconditional target of a 45% reduction in emissions remains a challenge, particularly due to financial constraints. As a developing country, Malaysia requires external funding to meet its climate goals, and setting unconditional targets could send a misleading message that it can achieve these goals without the necessary financial support. For NDC 3.0, Malaysia should **reintegrate conditionality into its national NDC, emphasising the need for external support**, addressing equity concerns and ensuring that mitigation efforts remain flexible and feasible. Additionally, a greater focus on **incorporating adaptation co-benefits** as part of the national strategy could help enhance resilience to climate impacts while simultaneously supporting mitigation efforts, allowing mutual reinforcement. Aligning mitigation, adaptation, and financial support would enable Malaysia to progress toward its climate commitments without compromising economic stability.

Part B: Post-COP29 Forum

The discussion on mitigation explored Malaysia's existing efforts, gaps, and opportunities in reducing greenhouse gas emissions across key sectors. In the energy sector, the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR) outlines a strategic framework to reduce fossil fuel reliance. However, fossil fuels still account for over 70% of the energy mix, renewable energy integration remains limited by grid constraints, and fossil fuel subsidies remain a significant barrier to transition. At a broader level, initiatives such as the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) offer opportunities for capacity building, investor dialogue, and international cooperation to support mitigation efforts across sectors though their impact remains to be fully realised. At the sectoral level, opportunities lie in accelerating coal phase-out, enhancing energy efficiency, and tapping into growing international climate finance, but threats include the unchecked growth of energy-intensive industries like data centres. In the transportation sector, urban rail systems in Klang Valley, Penang, Johor Bahru, and Kuching's green hydrogen initiatives show early progress, yet weak last-mile connectivity, an overreliance on highways, and an inadequate EV infrastructure undermine sustainable transport goals. Shifting freight to rail and increasing electrification offer clear opportunities, although behavioural inertia, poor freight rail expansion, and inadequate EV battery waste policies pose significant threats.

For the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector, Malaysia's commitment to maintaining 50% forest cover is a strength, enhanced by mechanisms like the Ecological Fiscal Transfer (EFT). Still, inconsistencies in carbon stock modeling and potential overestimation of sinks undermine credibility. Expanding financial incentives for forest conservation offers opportunities, while threats include land-use pressures and global carbon market skepticism. The waste sector benefits from an established, though basic, management system, but remains hampered by landfill overreliance, outdated data, and fragmented waste separation. Strengthening policies, infrastructure investment, and data transparency could optimize resource use, but ongoing waste imports and exposure to global "waste colonialism" threaten progress toward a circular economy. In the palm oil sector, high-value crops and certification standards (such as RSPO and MSPO) present a strong foundation, but inefficiencies in supply chains and heavy labour reliance persist. Enhancing supply chain regulation and prioritizing nature-based solutions could drive improvements, yet external threats like the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and shifting trade dynamics could impact market access. In brief, Malaysia's growing role in international climate negotiations and multilateral platforms offer important avenues for strengthening its mitigation trajectory such as MWP. However, across all sectors, systemic barriers including poor inter-ministerial coordination, fragmented data systems, and the slow pace of regional cooperation continue to hinder effective implementation and policy coherence.

Recommendations

1. **Enhancing Policy Coordination and Governance:** Strengthen inter-ministerial coordination to improve climate governance and policy coherence. Platforms such as the MWP should be made more accessible and inclusive for diverse stakeholders.
2. **Accelerating the Energy Transition:** Expand investments on renewable energy, accelerate the phase-out of coal, and upgrade grid infrastructure to support energy storage and the widespread adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) adoption.
3. **Transforming the Transport Sector:** Enhance last-mile connectivity, invest in the electrification of public, freight, and commercial transport, and shift policy focus from car-centric infrastructure to integrated and inclusive public transport system. Develop long-term strategies for EV lifecycle management, including battery disposal.
4. **Advancing Waste Management and Circular Economy:** Improve data transparency and accessibility, implement stricter separation-at-source policies, and reduce reliance on landfills by investing in recycling and waste recovery infrastructure. Tackle waste imports through stronger enforcement and align national policies with circular economy principles.
5. **Strengthening LULUCF and Nature-Based Solutions:** Increase financial incentives for states to conserve forests, enhance carbon stock monitoring, and prioritise nature-based solutions (NbS) over imported technologies for emissions reduction and resilience-building.
6. **Enhancing Industry Decarbonization:** Ensure greater transparency in industrial emissions, support green supply chain initiatives, and address competitiveness challenges in ASEAN markets.
7. **Reforming Subsidies and Economic Incentives:** Gradually phase out fossil fuel subsidies while introducing targeted financial mechanisms such as carbon pricing to incentivise emission reductions.

NEGOTIATION TRACK IV: ARTICLE 6

- Article 6 was highly contentious at COP29, with the negotiations for 6.2 and 6.4 expected to be concluded during this conference. This included the much-lauded – and criticised – “operationalisation” of 6.4 at the opening of the conference.
- Article 6.2 and 6.4, which pertains to bilateral and multilateral (under the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism) carbon trading respectively, was successfully operationalised by the end of the conference, though certain reporting requirements and crediting standards still come under criticism. While Article 6.8 oversees non-market approaches towards collaborative emissions reduction, which seeks more capacity building and support for parties’ implementation.
- Malaysia, as a developing nation rich with carbon sinks, is in the process of formalising its emissions trading scheme, under the national carbon market policy, in accordance with UNFCCC standards which ensure high-integrity carbon credits. The country must ensure its credits issuance is adequately balanced with national mitigation needs while building capacity internally to ensure it is able to contribute towards the global cooperative framework efficiently.

Part A: COP29

“Article 6” negotiations, in reference to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, depict cooperative measures between Parties to achieve mitigation goals via internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). Article 6 was arguably one of the most contentious negotiations at COP29, second only to the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Simply put, the urgency stems from a surmount of pressure to conclude the negotiations at Baku after deferrals spanning multiple conferences over the past few years.

Negotiations on Article 6 are primarily split into three tracks, based on their respective functions. A simplified breakdown of the sub-articles are as follows:

Item	Description
Article 6.2	Depicts bilateral or regional cooperation of Parties via emissions trading. This is facilitated via nature-based solutions (e.g., verified forest reserves) or technological solutions (e.g., renewable energy certificates).
Article 6.4	Also known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), this international emissions trading scheme is officially facilitated under the UNFCCC.

Article 6.8	Refers to the Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches (NMAs), centring cooperative approaches to emissions reduction not involving carbon markets, primarily anchored by community-based projects.
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In essence, Article 6 presents itself as an opportunity for Parties, especially those who lack the natural resources or capacity, to achieve its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), while Parties with rich abatement sources contribute towards global cooperation for emissions reduction whilst catalysing additional resources for itself such as finance.

Article 6 negotiations are also related to the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and there is some discussion pertaining to synergising the transition from CDM to Article 6 mechanisms, however this item was not tracked due to additional complexity and thus will not be explored within the report.

For context, types of carbon markets are defined below:

Market Type	Description
Compliance	Compliance carbon markets are markets governed by mandatory cap-and-trade systems set by governments or international bodies. Entities which fall under the purview of compliance carbon markets must buy permits or credits to cover emissions above their allocated cap.
International	The international carbon market under Article 6.4 is also known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). As its name suggests, this is hosted under the Paris Agreement to allow cooperative approaches between countries to meet their NDC targets, with the intention of upholding the highest standards of integrity.
Voluntary	Voluntary carbon markets (VCMs) refer to voluntary emissions reduction taken upon by private sectors, as its name suggests, within a carbon market driven outside directly national or UNFCCC-level purview.

Article 6 is not shy of controversy within COP. In particular, surrounding Article 6.2 and 6.4 are human rights concerns surrounding grassroots and indigenous communities, of which some groups have gone so far as to blanket refer to the mechanism as a “false solution”. These concerns are not unwarranted and stem from previous cases of greenwashing and other unethical practices, for example, how 90% of Verra’s carbon credits were found to be not rooted in real emissions reductions in 2023. Hence, the uptake of Article 6 implementation must be rooted in strict principles of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) – among elements which make up “high-integrity” carbon trading.

The Article 6 negotiation tracks were also particularly illustrative of the difficulties faced on the ground by observers and party overflow badge holders of COP29, with accounts of censorship and expulsion on official conference grounds (including within the Blue Zone which is only accessible to accredited individuals) despite the entitlement of observers (including allocated seats) and party overflow badge holders in negotiation rooms. Towards Week 2 of the conference, for Article 6.2 and 6.4 in particular, there was limited access to negotiations and most access for observers and party overflow badge members were restricted to overflow rooms, which regularly experienced overcrowding or connectivity issues. There were also accounts of observer seats being reduced or controlled, once again despite being entitled to seats in the negotiations. This presented difficulties in delegates' ability to fully participate in the process by the end of the conference.

Article 6.2 and 6.4

In the Paris Agreement, paragraph 2 of Article 6 is defined as:

2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

While paragraph 4 is elaborated as follows:

4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, and shall aim:

- a. To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;*
- b. To incentivise and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorised by a Party;*
- c. To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission*

reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
d. To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.

Article 6.4 in particular made questionable strides on the opening of the conference, with COP29 President-designate Mukhtar Babayev himself gavelled the “operationalisation”. While some celebrated this as a landmark achievement, others, particularly those from civil society, criticised the move as being particularly hasty and signalling a need for publicity achievement, mirroring COP28’s operationalisation of the Fund Responding to Loss and Damage on its very first day. Regardless, it was assured that negotiations would carry forward, and that the terms surrounding Article 6.4 would still be debated upon throughout the next two weeks, calling into further question the meaning of such a gesture.

The general positioning of Article 6.2 and 6.4 broadly differs, along with implications of implementation, between Global North and Global South players. Essentially, the main function of Article 6 is designated by clause 3 (bolded for emphasis):

*3. The use of **internationally transferred mitigation outcomes [ITMOs]** to achieve nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authori[s]ed by participating Parties.*

This cooperative measure serves a crucial function for Global North nations, who are often developed and therefore lack the mitigation means via natural resources, which pertain to the majority of carbon removals. Hence, an agreement is made between “buyer” (host) and “seller” countries on said mitigation outcomes in exchange for other resources, primarily finance. However, such engagements correspond to seller countries “selling” off their mitigation potential and therefore having less natural mitigation resources to rely on, presenting difficulty in this tradeoff-transaction as well as accounting for traded mitigation outcomes via reporting.

Through this, a contrast in perception – tied to differences between Global North and Global South positioning – has surfaced. Recent times have seen discourse on carbon markets straying from the original intended purpose of mitigation under ITMOs, and instead as a tool for facilitating climate finance, a viewpoint largely driven by Global North actors. While the correlation between carbon markets and finance at this point is inseparable, this narrative comes into criticism as a means to skirt legitimate (public) climate finance contributions Global North countries are obligated to, by diverting this responsibility towards the Article 6 mechanism.

It was also observed that Global South countries have a vested interest in the proper articulation and operationalisation of Article 6.4, with emphasis on its integrity standards and

interoperability with Article 6.2. This is because PACM pertains to a global standard and many Global South nations do not have the capacity to develop their own independent carbon markets. Hence, there is the intention to carry over 6.4 standards for 6.2 implementation.

Preamble aside, elements of contention surrounding the implementation of Article 6.2 and 6.4 are broken down into, but are not limited to, the following items:

Item	Description
Additionality	Additionality is generated when a project delivers “additional” emissions reduction that would not have existed without engagement in carbon market mechanisms.
Authorisation	Authorisation describes a host country’s formal consent for the transfer of emission reductions under international carbon markets.
Avoidance emissions	<p>A controversial item, avoidance emissions describe emission reductions which stem from preventing future emissions.</p> <p>Discussion on avoidance emissions will be revisited in 2028 and are currently excluded from Article 6.2 and 6.4 mechanisms. This could signal a higher demand for standards of integrity from Parties, as it requires the market to engage in either emissions reductions or removals, and allow more time to develop safeguards from over-crediting and development of a more rights-based approach.</p>
Carbon removals	Broadly, carbon removals describe the process of taking out carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere. This can be done through natural (e.g., reforestation) or technological-based measures (e.g., direct air capture).
Corresponding adjustment; double counting	<i>Corresponding adjustments</i> are quantitative accounting corrections made by a host country when it transfers ITMOs to another country, for the purpose of avoiding double counting and ensuring there are tangible climate benefits to the process. Here, <i>double counting</i> refers to when an emission reduction or removal is counted more than once, for example, by both buyer and seller countries, or across different compliance markets.
Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)	FPIC describes the right of indigenous populations to freely decide whether carbon market projects are allowed on their land prior to the project’s conduct. This means the involvement of grassroots and indigenous communities throughout the conceptualisation and execution of said

	<p>projects, integration of indigenous rights and knowledge systems to facilitate a co-creation process, as well as the right of these communities to deny project developers access to their land for carbon market implementation purposes.</p> <p>FPIC is a foundational safeguard against exploitation in carbon markets, in particular considering forest-based offsets and land-based carbon removals. PACM has integrated mandatory checks for projects addressing environmental and human rights, including safeguards which aim to ensure projects cannot move forward without explicit FPIC as well as grievance mechanisms. However, national and subnational implementation of these standards by Parties remain crucial.</p>
High-integrity	<p>“High-integrity” carbon credits refers to carbon credits that are credible, verifiable, permanent and contribute to real climate action. For developing nations, high-integrity carbon credits must include social and environmental co-benefits, community participation model of co-creation, as well as fair revenue sharing, and must not undermine justice, sovereignty or human rights of those involved.</p> <p>The decision text of Article 6.2 and 6.4 emphasises real, transparent, additional, conservatively estimated credits with social safeguards and sustainable development tools, in addition to oversight and grievance rights for Indigenous and community groups. Regardless, the actual implementation remains to be seen on whether these high-integrity standards are upheld.</p>
Interoperability	<p>Interoperability refers to the compatibility between carbon registries for cross-system transfers. This not only includes linkages between Article 6.2 and 6.4, but also external mechanisms such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).</p>
Permanence	<p>The permanence of carbon credits refers to the durability of emissions reductions or removals over time. The general aim is to facilitate carbon market projects with verifiable permanence.</p>
Share of proceeds	<p>Share of proceeds describes a mandatory levy from Article 6.4 trades which are allocated to adaptation (and global mitigation) measures, specifically the Adaptation Fund and the Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions (OMGE) respectively.</p>

Such elements also bled into other negotiation items – most pertinently the NCQG, where VCMs were briefly included as a form of alternative or innovative form of climate financing, which was eventually removed from the final text after much controversy. Such an item was criticised as further complicating the obligation of fulfilment for the public finance goal by Annex I Parties.

Negotiations for Article 6.2 and 6.4 passed after much delay, preceding only the NCQG. While the outcomes of COP29 mark a significant achievement for carbon market mechanisms, the devil is always in the details and real-world implementation. Moving forward, it is crucial for Parties to further improve upon items of contention and ensure that the highest standard of integrity, accountability and science-based information is incorporated into Article 6 implementation based on its progress, and to ensure it reflects real-world benefits rather than as a tool manipulated by the market.

Article 6.8

Paragraph 8 in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is as below:

8. Parties recogni[s]e the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate. These approaches shall aim to:

- a. Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition;*
- b. Enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions; and*
- c. Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements.*

In comparison to the negotiations of Article 6.2 and 6.4, 6.8 negotiations were certainly less contentious, however still requiring Parties' alignment. The beginning of 6.8 sessions highlighted the key progress and achievements of its outcomes since convening at Dubai before delving into negotiations. The main agenda surrounding 6.8 negotiations centred on improvements and ways forward from these items, with a central focus on capacity building and encouraging further collaboration on NMAs. These discussions and negotiation items are briefly summarised as follows:

- **National Focal Points for Article 6.8:** National 6.8 Focal Points are designated officials or institutions responsible for coordinating a country's engagement in NMAs. UNFCCC secretariat encouraged the nomination of more National 6.8 Focal Points from parties

and sought out the needs of parties in capacity building, technical and institutional support for Focal Points.

- **NMA Portal:** The NMA Portal is a UNFCCC-managed online platform launched in 2023. It facilitates the sharing, registration, and coordination of non-market approaches between countries and stakeholders (both UNFCCC-registered and otherwise), and acts as a repository for NMA proposals, provides a matching function between host countries and supporting partners, as well as a collection of good practices, methodologies and lessons learnt in implementation. UNFCCC secretariat encouraged further uptake of the NMA portal among parties, and parties collectively strived towards discussions and commitments to make the platform more accessible, particularly for external stakeholders.
- **Climate cafés:** Conventionally, climate cafés are community-led, informal, inclusive spaces for dialogue, education, and reflection on climate change. In the context of Article 6.8 negotiations, they were a space for thematic exchange between National 6.8 Focal Points, particularly to enhance North-South cooperation and ideas on 6.8 implementation. They were unanimously agreed to be a useful process facilitated by the UNFCCC and encouraged for more to take place as mandated events.

Recommendations for Malaysia

As a country rich with carbon sinks, the Article 6 agenda presents itself as a unique opportunity for Malaysia to utilise carbon markets in order to catalyse collaborative mitigation strategies on top of facilitating climate finance transfers onto itself. There is a need for Malaysia to adhere to the highest integrity standards of carbon markets however, as means of being cautious towards the existing market and ethical pitfalls, on top of balancing the emissions accounting of national mitigation targets, given the country's robust emissions reductions from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF).

A brief summary of the current progress of Malaysia's market-based mechanisms addressing carbon includes the drafting of the carbon tax mechanism led by the Ministry of Finance and World Bank, covering the areas of iron, steel and energy (as announced by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim during Budget 2025), with the expectation of it being finalised in 2026; as well as a carbon market policy (*Dasar Pasaran Karbon Kebangsaan* – DPKK), including registry, which will align with PACM under the national climate change act (*Rang Undang-Undang Perubahan Iklim Negara* – RUUPIN).

Malaysia possesses robust developments on its local VCM; prominently, the Bursa Carbon Exchange (BCX) led by Bursa Malaysia, the national stock exchange, which has overseen nature-based carbon credits (e.g., the Kuamut Rainforest Conservation Project) and technology-based carbon credits (e.g., the Langkap Biogas Plant). The Malaysian Forest Fund

(MFF), under NRES, is also in the midst of developing standards on market-based mechanisms, of note being the National Guidance on Forest Carbon Market. It also provides support via the Forest Conservation Certificate (FCC) protocol and the Forest Carbon Offset (FCO), instruments for the private sector to involve itself in conservation projects on a voluntary nature. In parallel to this, numerous airlines operating under Malaysia (such as AirAsia and Malaysian Airlines) are independently active in the CORSIA efforts and advocacy.

A memorandum of collaboration for the ASEAN Common Carbon Framework (ACCF) was signed at the Malaysian Pavilion during the eighth day of COP29, with oversight of representatives from Malaysia (Malaysian Carbon Market Association), Singapore (Singapore Sustainable Finance Association), Indonesia (Indonesia Carbon Trade Association), Thailand (Thailand Carbon Markets Club) and ASEAN (ASEAN Alliance on Carbon Market). The framework is intended to catalyse a regional standard of Southeast Asian carbon markets, per the ASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality and in line with Malaysia's 2025 ASEAN chairmanship advocacy. While the development of a regional carbon trading scheme is desirable, much work needs to be done to ensure interoperability where independent implementation of carbon markets among ASEAN member states remains at vastly different stages, in order to truly embody the idealised regional approach.

Beyond that, after the conclusion of COP29, Malaysia has signed Article 6.2 agreements with Singapore and South Korea. More bilateral and multilateral engagements can be expected to be unveiled and as Article 6 implementation matures over time.

Despite these developments, reception from the third sector remains polarised. Civil society and grassroots organisations, in particular, Sahabat Alam Malaysia's carbon pricing critique highlights the pitfalls of carbon pricing implementation since the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, including but not limited to the flawed implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) as a case study. There have also been various cases of dissent from local communities, and even improper implementation of FPIC, such as the recent assertions from the Centre of Orang Asli Concerns which decried Enggang Sdn Bhd for engaging in exclusionary consultative processes, deliberately using obfuscating language and a lack of indigenous rights implementation per UN standards such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPR). These perspectives must be taken into account in Malaysia's carbon pricing development so as to ensure equity and a just transition remain at the forefront of national climate action.

That being said, the report's recommendations for Malaysia's further implementations of Article 6 are as follows:

- Malaysia's **alignment on high-integrity carbon trading standards per the PACM** is a positive measure. It is crucial for Malaysia to not fall victim towards carbon colonialism practices via taking on more developed nations' emissions, by balancing its own NDC needs with its realistic surplus capacity to trade carbon credits across borders.
 - Malaysia must abide by and advocate for **stringent standards regarding the integration of carbon pricing into NDCs**, both in terms of local and international implementation. Ideally, the integration of carbon pricing into NDCs should be avoided or capped as meaningful mitigation measures should be encouraged at the national level to achieve respective NDCs. In that sense, carbon trading via offsets should be avoided at the NDC level.
 - **Barring avoidance emissions** is encouraged regardless of UNFCCC-level decisions to ensure greenwashing is evaded in carbon pricing implementation and meaningful emissions reductions are generated.
- Malaysia must develop a **robust MRV framework and build capacity** among sectors and players who will fall under the purview of carbon pricing policies.
- Implementation of carbon markets, especially nature-based, must **strictly abide by principles of FPIC** (including with respect to agreements which are rejected and projects which do not see the light of day as a result), UNDRIP and UNGP, ensuring **meaningful co-benefits can be generated for local communities involved, including adaptation measures**.
- **Appointment of a National Focal Point for Article 6.8.** This would provide Malaysia access to the NMA Platform and other resources, overall allowing us to develop a more holistic approach towards our involvement in 6.8 activities.
- On ACCF, CORSIA and VCM:
 - Along with alignment on UNFCCC standards, ACCF must ensure **inclusive alignment among all ASEAN members** to create a meaningful and robust interoperable regional carbon trading framework. As ASEAN members are at different levels of sophistication when it comes to their respective carbon pricing mechanisms, from Singapore's integration at the NDC level and buyer status to the lack of implementation of numerous ASEAN member states, inclusive stakeholder consultations and capacity building at all levels (including among all third sector stakeholders, crucially grassroots communities) must take place to ensure a framework which meaningfully embodies its namesake and mission.
 - CORSIA and VCM must also align with national carbon pricing standards, especially if it is to be integrated with UNFCCC standards. More stakeholder consultation and capacity building should take place to ensure all parties involved are sufficiently empowered to co-create mitigation outcomes.

Part B: Post-COP29 Forum

The discussion on carbon markets explored both voluntary and compliance carbon markets were discussed, considering international and domestic implications. One of the key strengths identified for Malaysia was to capitalise emissions reduction efforts, not only to meet its NDCs but also to contribute to the global 1.5°C goal. By participating in carbon trading, Malaysia could attract investments, drive technological innovation, and create new job opportunities, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors. However, several challenges were noted, including the risk of double counting, concerns over greenwashing, and the integrity of carbon credits. Without clear safeguards, there is a danger that emissions reductions could be exaggerated or misreported, weakening the overall credibility of the market. Additionally, the complexity of regulatory processes and the lack of a well-defined national framework could deter investors and slow market development.

Despite these challenges, the discussion highlighted several promising opportunities. By leveraging ASEAN partnerships, Malaysia could help establish regional carbon market standards, ensuring consistency and trust in the system. This could also open pathways for international climate finance, facilitating projects that support both environmental goals and socio-economic benefits. A key recommendation was to ensure that local communities, particularly indigenous groups, are actively involved in carbon projects through mechanisms such as FPIC, preventing exploitation and ensuring fair benefit-sharing. On the other hand, threats such as market oversaturation, lack of clear guidelines, and political instability were noted as potential obstacles to effective implementation. Furthermore, concerns were raised over how Malaysia can engage in carbon trading without undermining its own climate commitments. To navigate these risks, the discussion emphasized the need for robust governance, transparent tracking systems, and inclusive policymaking that prioritizes both environmental integrity and social equity.

Recommendations:

1. **Ensuring Environmental and Social Integrity:** The need for strong safeguards, such as FPIC for local communities, is essential to prevent greenwashing and ensure projects genuinely contribute to emissions reduction and additional benefits such as biodiversity protection and other SDGs.
2. **Leveraging Carbon Markets for Innovation:** Malaysia can use carbon markets to attract investments in green technologies, stimulate job creation, and facilitate technology transfer while maintaining its environmental commitments.
3. **Increasing support and capacity building for Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs):** Training and capacity building workshops for SMEs and local businesses on reporting, accountability and transparency to enhance their participation in bigger high integrity carbon market projects.

4. **Regional and Global Collaboration:** Establishing ASEAN-wide carbon market standards can enhance market credibility, create equitable trading mechanisms and allow trading in international markets.

CONCLUSION

Malaysia at COP29

At COP29, Malaysia engaged in several key global climate initiatives central to its participation in the broader UNFCCC negotiation framework. These included the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), carbon market mechanisms under Article 6, as well as the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).

Malaysia also took the opportunity to communicate its commitments and demands to advance its climate agenda. At the Second Part of the COP29 High-Level Segment, YB Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad reaffirmed Malaysia's commitment to its climate ambitions and called on developed countries to fulfill their climate obligations rather than diverting resources to warfare and conflict. Meanwhile, Kuala Lumpur's Mayor, H.E. Dr. Maimunah Mohd Sharif, delivered a powerful message emphasizing the urgency of climate action. Representing cities on the frontlines of the climate crisis, she highlighted Kuala Lumpur's commitment to climate resilience, particularly through BiodiverCities, a transformative initiative that turns urban areas into thriving biodiversity hubs. Additionally, Malaysia held high-level bilateral meetings with various delegations to foster meaningful international collaboration.

The Malaysia Pavilion at COP29 showcased the nation's commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 under the theme "In Solidarity for a Green World." Featuring seven thematic clusters representing key climate action areas, the Pavilion hosted 46 sessions with local and international speakers, highlighting Malaysia's strategic initiatives for a sustainable future. As part of its commitment to inclusive climate action, the "Youth & Adaptation" cluster aimed to amplify the voices of youth, women, and indigenous communities, which MYD was honoured to be part of. Discussions in this cluster focused on operationalising environmental rights, assessing Malaysia's COP29 progress, and exploring pathways for collective action. Notably, MYD shared the stage with YB Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad and Meenakshi Raman from Third World Network to discuss the implications of COP29 outcomes for Malaysia.

This engagement signified a great collaboration between CSOs and stakeholders of different industries, as well as provided a platform for CSO that represent people's voices at an international stage and amplifies the message of communities being at the frontline of facing climate impacts. However, despite providing a platform for underrepresented groups, a stakeholder analysis by Malaysia Green Tech Corporation (MGTC) found that civil society organisations (CSOs) occupied only 19 speaking slots, accounting for just 10% of the 185 invited speakers at Malaysia's Pavilion. While CSOs offer valuable perspectives representing public interests, their limited participation underscores the financial and logistical challenges that continue to hinder their presence at COP29.

At a certain point, meaningful engagement becomes insubstantial, as MYD had limited opportunities to meaningfully collaborate with the organisers in curating the sessions, resulting in reduced influence over the agenda and content despite their presence at the focus group discussions with the aforementioned clusters. With that, MYD puts forward several recommendations for the Malaysian delegation and Malaysia Pavilion:

- Providing more support for CSOs is crucial in ensuring inclusive climate action. The focus group discussion involving diverse stakeholders from various sectors played a key role in shaping sessions at the Malaysian Pavilion, reflecting the country's commitment to inclusivity. However, there needs to be a balance between broad participation and genuine influence to avoid tokenism. While CSOs were engaged, they had limited influence in designing the session. The focus group discussion conduct also felt extractive as opposed to a meaningful co-creation process with the enlisted consultants, and coordination channels were inconsistent across stakeholders and sessions throughout the process. Moving forward, ensuring that CSOs are appropriately engaged in discussions will be key to fostering truly inclusive climate action.
- An immersive Pavilion design that showcases Malaysia's heritage, sustainability, and inclusivity
 - Incorporate elements that reflect Malaysia's rich cultural heritage and biodiversity. The Malaysia Pavilion at COP30 should serve as an immersive showcase of the nation's rich biodiversity and cultural heritage, reinforcing Malaysia's identity as a mega-diverse country. Inspired by tropical rainforests, the Pavilion's architecture can feature eco-friendly materials like bamboo, rattan, and reclaimed wood, symbolizing Malaysia's ecosystems. Indigenous artworks from Orang Asli, Kadazan-Dusun, Iban, and Bajau communities, alongside Malay, Chinese, and Indian cultural motifs, can be incorporated into the design to reflect Malaysia's diverse heritage. Interactive spaces could offer storytelling, craftsmanship demonstrations, and indigenous knowledge-sharing to highlight the connection between culture and conservation.
 - The Malaysia Pavilion at COP29 should embody zero or minimal waste principles, ensuring a sustainable and reusable design that can be adapted for future events instead of being a one-off structure. Instead of tiered seating and enclosed walls, the Pavilion can feature an open-concept layout with flexible seating arrangements, using chairs and wireless headphones to create an inclusive, adaptable space that accommodates different session formats and usable for upcoming conferences as well. An open-concept layout also attracts visitors easily.

Further recommendations

The mobilisation of resources remains a critical barrier across multiple negotiation tracks, with the lack of means of implementation – including finance, capacity building, and technology transfer – continuing to hinder climate action, particularly for developing countries. The shortfall in the new finance goal has drawn significant criticism, as it exacerbates resource constraints and fails to fulfill its intended purpose of prioritizing the needs of developing nations. Despite these challenges, all stakeholders must remain committed to collective action, ensuring sustained efforts to limit global warming and advance progressive climate solutions.

Set to take place in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025, COP30 will mark the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement, making it a pivotal moment to accelerate climate action. With the new finance goal finalized at COP29, Brazil now bears a great responsibility to lead efforts in mobilizing finance, ensuring a credible strategy to align financial flows with climate goals. Additionally, with NDC 3.0 due this year, Brazil must play a key role in shaping a shared global understanding that NDCs must be resilient and aligned with the 1.5°C goal. Countries must arrive in Belém with a strong commitment to ambitious national goals and to fostering international enabling conditions that accelerate inclusive climate action.

As home to some of the world's most important natural ecosystems, the Amazon shares many challenges with Malaysia, one of the world's most megadiverse countries. Malaysia must use COP30 as an opportunity to escalate its demands for a just mobilisation of resources to protect biodiversity. The Amazon, like Malaysia, faces severe threats such as deforestation, dam-building projects, and ecosystem degradation, which harm both the environment and the communities that depend on it. Local, traditional and Indigenous communities in both regions have long been adapting to these challenges, demonstrating valuable knowledge and solutions. Malaysia must amplify these perspectives, fostering global recognition of Indigenous knowledge, local adaptation strategies, and biodiversity conservation efforts as essential pillars of the climate agenda.

At COP30, Malaysia must seize the opportunity to strengthen international collaboration, push for equitable resource distribution, and advocate for nature-based solutions that benefit both people and the planet.

In 2025, MYD remains committed towards its goals of galvanising youth climate advocacy through policy, aiming to build the capacity of its target audiences towards Malaysian climate policy in an accessible manner. The organisation also aims to continue fostering meaningful collaborative efforts, and will continue to engage with all levels of stakeholders in order to do so.

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APPENDIX I: DISCLOSURE ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

External Funding

Delegate	Source of Funding	Amount	Coverage
Khalisah Khairina	Southeast Asian Youth in Climate Diplomacy Fellowship Program	RM 2,264.56 (900 manat)	Daily expenses
Kieran Li Nair	Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia	RM 3,800.00	Flight for round trip

Note: These funding were allocated through independent applications submitted by each delegate based on their fellowship and employment affiliation respectively.

MYD's Financial Assistance

Delegate	50% of Flight Ticket	100% of Accommodation	Total Reimbursement from MYD
Hanis Alwani	RM 1,588.70	RM 638.46	RM 2,227.16
Khalisah Khairina	RM 1,588.70	RM 638.46	RM 2,227.16

Note:

- 1. MYD raised a total of RM 820 through MYD's crowdfunding campaign.*
- 2. MYD allocated funds from its crowdfunding campaign and internal funds to support Khalisah Khairina and Hanis Alwani in covering 100% of accommodation expenses and 50% of flight expenses.*
- 3. To ensure optimal use of limited funds, Kieran Li Nair turned down MYD's financial assistance due to her independent sponsorship from the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.*
- 4. All remaining expenses were covered by the delegates through personal funds.*

APPENDIX II: POST-COP29 FORUM

On 15 February 2025, MYD successfully hosted the Post-COP29 Forum in collaboration with WWF-Malaysia, Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), and the Sunway Centre for Planetary Health (SCPH). In addition to delegates sharing their on-the-ground experiences tracking negotiations at COP29, the forum also served as a platform to exchange invaluable insights and perspectives. It brought together a diverse group of stakeholders, including government officers, representatives from public and private sectors, academics, and civil society, highlighting the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement in advancing Malaysia's climate agenda.

Through a series of sharing sessions and thematic discussions, focusing on key areas such as mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, and carbon markets under Article 6. The forum facilitated in-depth engagement among participants. Notably, the focus group discussions utilised a SWOT analysis framework to examine Malaysia's current positions and progress on its climate journey. This exercise not only provided a space for reflection on international climate negotiations but also served as a catalyst for driving local climate action.

The outcomes of these discussions were consolidated into a set of recommendations, which formed Part B of each tracked topic. These recommendations aim to inform future actions and advocacy efforts. We are pleased to share that the results of these discussions have been captured and organised using Mural, and are presented below for reference and further engagement.


The Post-COP29 Forum was a resounding success, made possible by the active participation of a diverse group of attendees. We extend our deepest appreciation to our distinguished facilitators, Dr Yap Kok Seng (Mitigation), Farhana Shukor (Climate Finance), Lavanya Ramalaker (Adaptation), and Dr Mohd Hafdzuan Adzmi (Article 6), for their expert insights and thought-provoking contributions. Their guidance was instrumental in fostering meaningful discussions and shaping a deeper understanding of Malaysia's climate pathway across key thematic areas.

We would also like to extend our sincere thanks to all participants for their active engagement throughout the forum. Their diverse perspectives greatly enriched the discussions and deepened our collective understanding of the challenges and opportunities ahead. Their contributions are invaluable in informing how we can strengthen our efforts and move forward more effectively in addressing climate action.

Climate Finance Discussion Outcome


Facilitated by: Farhana Shukor

Rapporteurs: Lim Kai Sin & Krisutha



Adaptation Discussion Outcome

Facilitated by: Lavanya Rama Iyer
Rapporteurs: Hanis Alwani & Sofiya



Mitigation Discussion Outcome

Facilitated by: Dr Yap Kok Seng


Rapporteurs: Harmit Singh & Khalisah Khairina

POST-COP29 FORUM
SWOT ANALYSIS


Facilitator: Dr Yap Kok Seng

Rapporteur: Harmit & Lisa



Strengths



Weaknesses



Mitigation



ACTIONS

ACTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Mitigation Work Programme

NRES needs to make the focus of this work programme more accessible to all stakeholders

Climate Education

Start in Institut Pengajian for educators to implement in schools, primary and tertiary institutions

Note: Primary school students are much more attentive and implement it

ASEAN

Empowering NRES and inter-ministerial communication

To have a longer framework (5-10 years) that moves the regional economy towards sustainability

Article 6 (Carbon Market) Discussion Outcome

Facilitated by: Dr Mohd. Hafdzuan Adzmi

Rapporteurs: Kieran Li Nair & Jerene Tan Pooi Yee

